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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1  Research Topic 
 
This dissertation is based on South Africa’s change in approach to foreign investment in 
context of its obligations as a developing nation and in lieu of these changes, how the country’s 
plans will affect its position in the multilateral system. 
 
1.2 Topic Idea 
 
South Africa’s Foreign Investment Policy (FIP): Critical legal analysis of the country’s FIP 




Foreign investment has experienced two critical growth spurts in the last two centuries. The 
first growth spurt could largely be accrued to expansion of economic opportunities created by 
national laws which was aimed at governing foreign investment. The other critical growth spurt 
was the change of dynamic supported by new international rules on telecommunication and 
transport1. The further development of foreign investment was then stifled by the staging of 
two World Wars which compromised the new internationalised economy and limited trade 
relations between countries. Post 1945 foreign investment was gently re-established as the 
world reconstructed itself.2 It would then take another 50 years before foreign investment 
peaked.3 This could largely be contributed to the technological boom and the reduction costs 
in the transporting of goods.4 These fresh outlays of investments were accompanied by several 
bilateral treaties which grew from 500 in 1990 to about 2000 in the year 2000.5 An interesting 
                                                          
1 R Dolzer Principles of International Investment Law 3 ed (2008) 44 
2 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 44 
3 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 44 
4 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 45 
5 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 45 
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point of this period was that approximately 80 per cent of foreign investment in developing 
countries went to a dozen states, predominantly in Asia, whilst Africa experienced a decline in 
investment.6  
 
In support of this, over the last 20 years there have been a number of signed investment 
protection treaties entered into between countries, generally these are bilateral investment 
treaties (BITs). Due to the increase of BITs, there has been a steady rise of foreign investment. 
This development of foreign investment has been in conjunction with key developments in 
international law. International law has grown to encompass the multilateral trading system 
and several organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank, all of which are in place to support the 
development of the multilateral trade system and international law. These developments impact 
foreign investment as it is no longer characterised by a limited set of rules and few bilateral 
treaties which lacked in case law. An example of such development is the International Centre 
of Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)7 which has also grown expansively; this is 
evident in the number of cases that have been dealt with.8 This growth and development has 
created a binding nexus between international and national foreign investment policies.9 It is 
important to note that the growth and development of the ICSID has not been without certain 
issues arising between foreign investors and host nations. These issues pertain to host nations 
that find themselves vulnerable to arbitration due to the BITs agreements conflicting with the 
host nations domestic laws and policies.  
 
The incorporation of foreign investment law into domestic law and the manner in which these 
domestic and international rules interplay is a central point of this paper. Organisations like the 
                                                          
6 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 46 
7  International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes is an international arbitration institution which 
hosts and assists the arbitration of legal disputes between international investors. 
8  R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 46 
9 The nexus between foreign investment law and international law stems from three legal sources; investment 
contracts between foreign investors and the relevant country, domestic legislation dictating foreign 
investment, and lastly international law and its investment treaties. In terms of investment in international 
law, this is predominantly dealt with via treaties that are aimed at protecting the foreign investor. There are 
also an extensive number of treaties that indirectly deal with investment. 
The next tier deals with domestic law and its efforts to promote and regulate foreign investment. Ultimately 
all laws of the land influence foreign investment however, states need to have specific legislation that 
regulates foreign investment in a positive manner that is consistent with international law. 
The final tier of law is investment contracts between individual investors and the host state. Contracts of this 




WTO, via negotiations, attempt to bridge the gap between these rules and international law.10 
However, how successful the WTO is at supporting host nations in this plight is arguable. Many 
host nations are developing countries and emerging markets that are dependent on foreign 
investment from developed countries. Many developing countries have grown tired of the lack 
of empowerment offered by the WTO, they feel that the WTO favours developed countries.11 
This argument forms the foundation of this paper and will be explored comprehensively to 
assess the relevance of the WTO in terms of developing countries and foreign investment. 
 
As an international organisation, the WTO intended to and soon became the primary 
international body at the forefront of free trade. Its formation represented a formalisation of the 
multilateral trading system that had previously not existed. It became the meeting point of 
various ideologies, relationships and rules. Furthermore, it promoted and dictated the terms of 
trade by drawing up rules for international trade.12 However, the organisation faced much 
criticism from many developing countries who believe that the WTO is a puppet of the richer, 
more developed countries.13  
 
A foundational principal of The WTO is its open market policy, this means by extending the 
reach of the market to reach across borders there can be international division of labour. This 
is attractive to many countries as it allows them to specialise and focus on industries to which 
they are most suited to.14 The concept of free trade has been a contentious subject in 
international trade for many years and whiles many economists are in favour of free trade, 
many groups oppose it for various reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper.15 Parties in 
favour of the organisation policies understand free trade to be a trading partnership that seeks 
equity in international trade by offering better trading conditions and securing the rights of 
marginalised members of the WTO.16 However, this principle is also largely opposed by 
domestic industries who feel they suffer the most at the expense of free trade. Such opponents 
of free trade believe that trade relations between the rich and poor countries are based on toxic 
                                                          
10 R Dolzer (noted 1 above) 46 
11 K Singh, ‘Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO, Issues and Illusions’ available at www.wto.org, 
accessed on 14 March 2014  
12 Lumina C, ‘Free Trade or Just Trade? The World Trade Organisation, human rights and development (Part  1)’ 
(2008)’ 12 AJOL 20, 22 
13 Ibid 22 
14 Craig Van Grasstek ‘The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation’ available at www.wto.org, 
accessed on 14 March 2014  
15 Noted 11 above, 23 
16 Noted 11 above, 23 
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relationships of dependency and as such there is very little protection offered to the developing 
countries.17  
 
Despite the criticism of the free trade ideal, the WTO is a strong proponent of free trade and 
the WTO system promotes the lowering of trade barriers to allow for trade to flow more freely.  
Ultimately the WTO is expected to provide the forum for negotiating and promoting trade 
liberalisation, as well as the manner it should be executed.18 These issues form the foundational 
understanding of the WTO and will be analysed in context of its effect on developing countries.  
 
In dealing with developing countries and their relationship with the WTO many of them have 
become disenchanted with the number negotiations that haven taken place without yielding 
positive results for countries in need of assistance.19 The negotiations have failed to show the 
many benefits of trade liberalisation and the imbalance in power is still prevalent in the WTO. 
Moreover the WTO has faced difficulty in accommodating trade issues concerning 
investment.20  
 
South Africa’s is a prime example of a frustrated developing country. This has resulted in them 
challenging their relationship with the WTO. As a result of these growing frustrations South 
Africa took a strong stance on the future of the Doha Development Agenda at the WTO’s 9th 
Ministerial Conference.21  South Africa was of the opinion that the conference needed to reach 
a fair and equitable deal, as there are growing fears regarding the WTO’s credibility and 
relevance to international trade.22 Regardless of whether a deal was reached or not, South 
Africa and the rest of the African continent still wish for a more beneficial deal that assists 
developing countries to a greater extent by holding the developed countries to a greater 
obligation.23  
 
                                                          
17 Noted 11 above, 23 
18 www.wto.org, accessed on 14 March 2014  
19 K Singh, ‘Multilateral Investment Agreement in the WTO, Issues and Illusions’ available at www.wto.org, 
accessed on 14 March 2014 
20 Ibid 
21 D Keet ‘South Africa’s official position and role in promoting the World Trade Organisation’ available at 
www.tni.org, accessed on 14 March 2014 
22 Ibid 
23 Geordin Hall Lewis ‘South Africa: WTO – DA Response to Key Issues at 9th Ministerial Conference, DA Press 
Release’  available at http://allafrica.com, accessed on 16 March 2014 
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The next focal point of the paper is the WTO’s legal framework and its approach to foreign 
investment. The WTO already has existing provisions that deal with foreign investment, the 
Agreement of Trade-Related Investment Measures (herein after referred to as TRIMS), which 
elaborates on GATT provisions.24 These provisions will be scrutinised in light of the changing 
geopolitical structure of foreign investment and the role of developing nations in stimulating 
foreign investment.25 
 
Furthermore, The WTO’s several rounds of negotiations and the regulation of foreign 
investment will be discussed in context of developing nations and their interactions with the 
WTO. The “Singapore issues” will be discussed as it is regarded as one of the most contentious 
issues of the WTO negotiations. These negotiations dealt with the issue of investment and the 
manner in which the WTO’s approach to investment.  In accounting for current day practices, 
attention will be paid rules applied to foreign direct investment through government to 
government BITs.26 
 
Foreign investment has great significance for developing countries as it has become a vital 
source of external financing for developing countries.27 Moreover it goes beyond assisting 
capital formation and sustaining resources; it promotes the transferring of production 
technology, skills, and increases country’s ability to innovate and creates access to international 
markets.28 Foreign investment has the ability to transform developing countries’ economies29  
and is the reason countries are in the process of taking the necessary steps to make themselves 
more attractive to investors. Therefore the global market is extremely competitive, especially 
for developing countries.30 Moreover with the liberal policies becoming gradually impotent in 
attracting foreign investment, governments are considering alternative approaches to facilitate 
foreign investment.31  
 
                                                          











South Africa has remained one of the leaders of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in Africa, 
despite the fact that they have suffered a decrease in FDI in the past three years. They also find 
themselves enjoying substantially more international attention via FDI than their continental 
siblings. It is this sort of attention that can facilitate the country to play a pivotal role on a 
regional, continental and international scale.32 
 
Furthermore, South Africa offers a sophisticated, unique, and diverse emerging market. It 
possesses a first world economic infrastructure, an abundance of natural resources and is 
situated in a key location, thus making it a prime investment location.33 However, there is still 
a need for South Africa to reassert itself on a global scale.  
 
With the world’s attention increasingly being focused on South Africa and Africa in general, 
several states and multinational companies are battling it out to increase their activity on the 
continent.34 South Africa’s locational advantage allows it to be a natural gateway to the rest of 
the continent. This has been a key factor behind South Africa’s elevation in status in the 
changing global landscape. In April 2011, the BRIC group of countries of Brazil, Russia, India 
and China agreed to admit South Africa as the newest member (therefore altering the name to 
BRICS).35 An opportunity of this nature provides a prime opportunity South Africa to assert 
their interests, as well as the continent’s interest during this time of change in the geopolitical 
and economic structure.36 
 
The South African Government, cognisant of this opportunity and in light of their frustration 
as developing country, has reacted by presenting the Promotion and Protection of Investment 
Bill, which will replace their BITs with several developed countries.37 These treaties have 
constituted the crux of the relationship between South Africa and its foreign investors and the 
Bill has thereby been met with mixed reactions as South Africa realigns itself with its fellow 
                                                          
32 ‘National Development Plan 2030, Our Future – make it work’,  available at www.npconline.co.za accessed 
on 31 March 2014  
33 Ibid 
34 Wang Yong ‘South Africa’s Role in the BRICS and the G-20: China’s view’ available at www.saia.org.za, 
accessed on 15 March 2014  
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Pieter Steyn ‘The New Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill – an assessment of its implications for 
local and foreign investors in South Africa’ available at www.werksmans.com, accessed on 3 March 2014. 
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BRICS members and other key nations.38 Based on the former, the research seeks to       
critically analyse whether the potential promulgation of this Bill is a step in the right direction 
for South Africa and whether the potential promulgation is in favour of the current multilateral 
trading system.  
1.4 Rationale 
 
South Africa is undergoing a transition that has national, regional, continental and international 
ramifications. The research for this paper critically explores the rationale for South Africa’s 
change of approach in terms of foreign investment. Specifically, the paper aims to shed new 
light on this approach by analysing old practices. Furthermore in reviewing this transformation, 
the research will include a critical examination of the Bill by ascertaining its positive and 
negative aspects.  
 
This ultimate objective of the paper is to inform readers whether there truly is need for South 
Africa to adapt to a new global structure or whether we are merely cowering to more developed, 
powerful economies of the world. Special attention will be cast on South Africa’s recent 
membership to the new emerging markets alliance; consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China 
and South Africa, better known as BRICS. The paper will evaluate the manner foreign 
investment relations may be improved upon in light of the responsibilities as a developing 
nation and member of BRICS. 
1.5 Statement of Purpose  
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically review South Africa’s change in approach to 
foreign investment by analysing past, present and future practices, including the imminent 
promulgation of The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill. This review is made in 
context of South Africa’s ambitions as a developing nation and as the newest member of the 
BRICS group.  
 
 
                                                          
38 Stefan Terblanche, ‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, Negative reaction to unwarranted’ 




1.6 Research questions 
 
1. To what extent has International law evolved to accommodate developing countries 
and how has the World Trade Organisation in particular promoted investment in 
developing countries. 
2. In what manner has South Africa dealt with the issue of foreign investment, in light of 
the changing geopolitical structure. 
3. To what extent does BRICS promote Foreign Direct Investment in South Africa. 
 
 
1.7 Research Goal / Hypothesis  
 
This paper hypothesises that: 
- The WTO’s future will be in question if it fails to give precedence to the needs of 
developing countries. 
- There is a need for a single international investment framework. 
- South Africa is acting in its own best interests by altering their approach to foreign 
investment. 
- South Africa is realigning itself with the new world powers. 
 
1.8  Research Methodology 
 
The research required for this study is desk-based. This paper requires a focus on, newspaper 
articles, cases, journal articles and textbooks. In context of a key portion of my paper, there is 
a need for interpreting and then analysing the relevant Bill and other supporting or likeminded 
legislation to determine South Africa’s strategy regarding foreign investment.  Furthermore, 
there needs to be a foundational understanding of both law and economics to do justice to the 






1.10  Literature Review 
 
The thesis will depend on a number of literatures in order to assess the research problem and 
provide suitable recommendations. 
 
The first source / work that need to be consulted is the National Development Plan. This critical 
analysis by the National Planning Commission (NPC) is a great point of departure for this 
research paper as it discusses South Africa’s current position in the world and elaborates on 
what needs to be done to execute its national, regional, continental and international goals. It 
presents a practical approach, cognisant of the realities facing South Africa. In this proposal 
from government, the NPC prioritises on aspects which will allow South Africa to work to its 
strengths. The proposal acknowledges the essential challenges facing South Africa; poverty 
and job creation and the need for these issues to be addressed in order for South Africa to 
become a global powerhouse. It goes on to discuss what South Africa would need to encourage 
foreign investment by maintaining a harmonious relationship between the Government and the 
private sector. Many argue this should be expanded on a regional scale in order to link with 
other booming nations and establish core relationships with their immediate neighbours. For 
South Africa to hold its own amongst its fellow members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, 
China and South Africa) it would need institutional strengthening such as enhancing the 
research capabilities of several Departments in order to encourage greater investment. This can 
also be assisted by expanding South Africa’s trade and investment and by improving roads and 
railways on a national scale. It is clear South Africa aspires to be a global leader; however the 
article suggests that they do not possess the power of other developing nations and need to 
focus on building relations with other key nations. By prioritising on certain nations, they will 
avoid being diplomatically compromised. This analysis has the ability to separate the domestic 
realities from South Africa’s geopolitical ambitions, therefore creating a good context of what 
is needed to encourage foreign investment.39  
 
A second source that needs to be critically analysed and which is of primary importance to the 
thesis is the Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013. The aim of the Bill is to 
encourage investment by providing protection to both the host nation and investor, in turn 
promoting foreign investment in South Africa. This will be applicable for all investments made 
                                                          
39 National Development Plan 2030, Our Future – make it work’,  available at www.npconline.co.za accessed on 
31 March 2014 
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with a commercial purpose and applies to all transactions made before or after the Bill is passed 
- public or private, domestic or foreign. The Bill’s primary focus is to act in the public’s interest 
and afford equal treatment to foreign investors and South African citizens. This will be 
critically assessed on a case to case basis, taking into account the nature and effect of the foreign 
investment, as well as the aim of the investment. The equal treatment for both South African 
citizens and foreign investors means that both parties are afforded equal security and 
restitution. Aggrieved parties are afforded a review in front of a competent court, as well as the 
option of dispute resolution. This constitutes a primary source which proves to be extremely 
useful as it lays out the legislative framework for both past and future investments. The Bill is 
further evident of South Africa’s attempt to streamline the investment process with foreign 
bodies and more importantly, empower itself. This in turn, provides a key justification as to 
why South Africa has cancelled their Bilateral Treaties with many European nations who they 
felt hard done by.40 
 
Furthermore, the analysis by Mr P. Steyn creates continuity from the initial analysis and 
summary   of the Bill and sheds light on the interpretational issues, amongst other criticism that 
the Bill faces.  South Africa’s attempts to modernise its relationship with several countries is 
at the expense of bilateral treaties which originally cemented the relationship between South 
Africa and its biggest trading partner the European Union. This does not sit well with many 
leading European nations as they feel exposed by the new Act. An example may be the need 
for foreign investors to comply with local laws, such as Black Economic Empowerment. Steyn 
highlights these issues in several sections of the Bill; in terms of national treatment of foreign 
investors the government dictates what would be “applicable” and therefore can manipulate 
the concept of national treatment to suit certain investors. Steyn goes on to discuss the 
interpretation of “expropriation”, as the Bill proposes a more rigid interpretation to the 
traditional understanding in Customary International law. This interpretation avoids South 
Africa having to deal with international arbitration. However this is not to say the Bill prohibits 
international arbitration, instead it empowers itself by requiring the Government’s consent 
before international arbitration can take place. Another interpretational issue in terms of 
Section 2 of the Bill which may allow for certain nations to override the Bill. Another issue of 
contention may be found in the difference between South Africa’s approach and the Southern 
African Developing Community (SADC) who are in favour of International Arbitration. 
                                                          
40 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 
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Steyn’s article has exposed several key issues that need to be addressed for this Bill to be a 
success; the article itself provides context and the danger of European fall out. Furthermore the 
article exposes the shortcomings of the Bill that may lead to crucial clauses being 
circumvented. The reason for moving away from Bilateral Treaties is also explained. 
Ultimately Steyn shows the need for a clear, concise investment framework for South Africa 
to build on.41 
 
The previous article by Steyn highlighted some of the key issues that shed a negative light on 
the Bill; however the article by S Terblanche of the Intelligence Bulletin proposes a more 
positive approach. Terblanche offers practical reasoning that provides greater context before 
one draws a final conclusion on the Bill. The article acknowledges the need for South Africa 
to adjust to the shift in International Relations and believes that the Bill fits this purpose. 
Furthermore it rebuts the claim that investors’ rights are non-existent in the Bill. It suggests 
there has been an over exaggeration in pre-empting the Bill when the reality is South Africa is 
indeed altering its focus towards its fellow members of BRICS. This move affords South Africa 
protection that it never found when dealing with the European Union. This shift by South 
Africa is an overt attempt to fill the gap between developing and developed nations. 
Historically this was extremely difficult with global organisation such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund that favoured the developed nations. These legislative efforts are 
evident that South Africa is aligning itself with the new global powerhouses, as well as the 
Government’s greater objectives and constitutional obligations. Terblanche goes on to suggest 
that there is life after the European Union as the Bill protects investors from all countries, 
especially countries that are heavily invested in South Africa. Furthermore South Africa is 
merely doing what several other countries have already done and with South Africa’s 
impeccable legal record, there is no reason to doubt the legal systems ability to deal with the 
possible responsibility bestowed by the Bill.42 
 
The article from Arvantis, A is of particular interest as it deals with the role of FDI in the 
development of South Africa’s economy by assessing key aspects such as market size and 
natural recourses. Furthermore it analyses the overall growth of FDI or lack thereof in South 
                                                          
41 Pieter Steyn ‘The New Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill – an assessment of its implications for 
local and foreign investors in South Africa’ available at www.werksmans.com, accessed on 3 March 2014. 
42 Stefan Terblanche, ‘Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, Negative reaction to unwarranted’ 
available at www.theintelligencebulletin.co.za, accessed on 5 March 2014  
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Africa by assessing the trends and characteristics of FDI in relation to South African initiative. 
The article looks at the reason why South Africa has faced a decline in foreign investment and 
ways to alter this, as well as comparing the approach of other developing nations. In context of 
this paper being orientated around FDI, the article provides a great foundation for the benefits 
that can be directly linked to foreign investment, benefits such as; strengthening international 
reserves and promoting growth by encouraging the technological process and industry. 
Furthermore it highlights the implications of FDI in South Africa by considering the degree of 
infrastructure, development, trade liberalisation, skills availability and several other factors, all 
of which provides crucial context needed in understanding FDI.43 
 
Gordhan, P, in his article provides a great foundation to understanding the importance of 
BRICS in light of the changing geopolitical landscape of the world. It explains the basics 
behind BRICS and South Africa’s entry as a member. It also provides an astute summary of 
each member’s potential to BRICS by explaining their current position in terms of global 
finances. Furthermore the build up to BRICS is explained covering issues from the fall of the 
Berlin Wall to the Arab Spring and everything between that culminated to the realignment of 
global power. Such context cannot be underestimated in light of South Africa’s membership 
and its new approach to foreign investment. Another key aspect of the article is assessing 
BRICS – what are its purpose and potential, as well as its relationship with South Africa. This 
includes discussing the relationship between China and South Africa and the current 
imbalance that exists. South Africa’s role cannot be underestimated as they are viewed to be a 
continental leader and it is their duty to encourage investment in Africa and empower locals 
to capitalise on these opportunities.44   
 
Much like many other articles used, the focus of Palemeter’s article is the GATT and the 
WTO. This article deals with the GATT and WTO from a critical legal aspect which is most 
important in context of this paper. It constitutes of an analysis of the GATT’s main principles 
and practices, such as the MFN principle and the practice of dispute settlement. The paper 
shows the progression of these principles by evaluating it. Such an evaluation is to establish 
whether or not the GATT system is primitive legal system or not. Furthermore this is 
followed by a similar evaluation of the WTO and its various annexes. Each annex is dissected 
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and discussed as primary and secondary rules. This application is a solid foundation to 
understanding the WTO and whether it suffers from fundamental flaws or has the potential to 
truly assist developing nations.45  
 
The article by Lumina, C, addresses both sides to the argument concerning free trade. It starts 
by explaining the WTO by offering a brief history of the organisation. Within this history the 
purpose of the WTO is laid out, that being; to improve the standard of living for the people of 
member states by establishing legally binding rules which promote free trade. The article 
goes on to address the various agreements of the WTO, with a special focus on multilateral 
trade relations. Lumina, then goes on to discuss the intense criticism the WTO has faced due 
to the nature of the agreements. There is a strong belief that the WTO does not protect the 
developing nations and has a negative impact of people’s livelihood. An important aspect of 
this article is the assessment of the concept of free trade and discussing the reasons certain 
groups are in favour of the concept and other groups are less fond of the concept. It 
importantly shows the nexus between free trade and the WTO and their efforts to perpetuate 
the practice of trade liberalisation.46 
 
The article by Thomas proves to be extremely useful as it provides an historical context to 
South Africa’s development in terms of FDI. It speaks of the 1980s as a failed decade of 
regional cooperation which becomes the premise for the birth of democracy and the pursuit 
global economic integration. The article moves on to discuss the WTO and its regional 
agreements with developing nations which is key portion of this paper. It does so by discussing 
the basics of GATT and key principles such as MFN, the concept of non-discrimination and 
the exception to basic commitments. These principles are discussed and applied to developing 
countries to show their effectiveness or lack thereof. The latter part of the article hones in on 
the SADC region of developing countries and their attempt to establish a framework of 
cooperation. This is vitally important to the paper as it deals with the African approach to FDI, 
specifically South Africa who is regarded by its fellow African nations to be “developed” and 
a leader of the continent.47  
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This article by Vickers is extremely pertinent to the topic at hand as it deals with the WTO’s 
Ministerial Conference in Bali which is the most current round of negotiations to have taken 
place. Many members have left the conference with renewed faith in WTO and the multilateral 
trading system. The conference dealt with issues that were largely mundane, however priority 
was also given to key principles of the WTO; Aid for trade and assisting of vulnerable 
economies. These issues are at the heart of this paper as they constitute a key point of the 
discussion and analysis of the WTO. Furthermore the Doha Development Agenda faced more 
criticism due to the disparities that remain between the rich and poor nations. The true utility 
of this article presents itself via the discussion on African concerns that remain unaddressed. 
The article discusses the many developing African nations who are frustrated by the imbalance 
of rules in the multilateral trading system. These nations, including South Africa, are calling 
for a greater focus on LDCs, duty free markets and strengthening of special and differential 
treatment provisions. Lastly the article briefly discusses South Africa’s need to adapt to the 
changing economic landscape by focussing on industrialisation and integration as well as 
concretise their relationship with fellow BRICS members.48  
 
Lastly, Michael Webb’s article evaluates South Africa’s foreign trade position under the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill and whether it will be a success or an error in 
judgement by the Department of Trade and Investment. Despite the confusion amidst South 
Africa cancelling its Bilateral Treaties with several European nations, they are still the go to 
investment destination for many investors. This article in evaluating the Bill, analyses the 
utility of Bilateral Treaties and the level of protection given to investors, specifically to protect 
them against host governments expropriating in a manner that is not fair and equitable. 
Furthermore, it balances the difference between international arbitration under Bilateral 
Treaties and the undesired complications and interpretational issues. Webb goes further 
explaining the purpose of bilateral treaties in drawing foreign investment and to offer comfort 
to foreign investors, however Webb argues that there is no clear nexus between Bilateral 
Treaties and Direct Foreign Investment. With the context laid down, the article then questions 
the effect of the Bill on entities, like the South African Bureau of Standards, which have 
lucrative relationships with signatories of bilateral treaties and whether such protection would 
be non – existent under the Bill. It is argued by Webb that the Bill does its best to balance the 
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interest of all relevant parties and is merely aligning itself to other progressive nations. The 




























                                                          





2.  TO WHAT EXTENT HAS INTERNATIONAL LAW EVOLVED TO 
ACCOMMODATE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HOW HAS THE WORLD 





There exists an inextricable link between international law and foreign investment. Interestingly, the 
many international organisations that pride themselves as being the champions of international law have 
largely side lined the issue of investment. Whether this has been intentional or not, investment has only 
recently come to the fore of international relations and organisations. Foreign investment has become 
crucial to many developing countries who wish to assert themselves in the multilateral trading system. 
This issue of investment forms part of the perpetual plight of developing countries in the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). In light of this, the chapter intends to assess to what extent has international law 
evolved to accommodate developing countries and how has the WTO in particular promoted investment 
in developing countries 
 
Firstly, the history of the multilateral trading system will be discussed to provide a foundation in terms 
of international trade and investment. Special attention is paid to the involvement of developing 
countries during this period. Secondly, it is important to discuss the relevant international organisations’ 
involvement in developing international trade and investment. Attention will be given to the General 
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in terms of developing countries, focusing on foreign 
investment. Lastly, the WTO will be analysed and discussed in terms of its establishment, the main 
principles of the organisation, the extent to which it assists developing nations, and whether it has 










2.2 The Multilateral Trading System 
 
2.2.1 Early development of the multilateral trading system 
 
The formation of the WTO represented a formalisation of the multilateral trading system that 
was previously non–existent.50 This establishment became the meeting point of various 
ideologies, relationships and rules which in the case of the WTO was law, economics and 
politics.51 The manner of the interactions between these disciplines has been one of the main 
criticisms faced by the WTO.   
 
In light of these criticisms, it seems appropriate to look at the multilateral trading system’s 
development. This development can be attributed to three key occurrences; the first being state 
sovereignty which allowed each state to dictate their interactions and development.52 
Interactions and development became the crux of binding agreements between states. These 
interactions required international law to create various tiers of rules and norms that 
empowered nations and promoted diplomacy.53 This resulted in various organisations that were 
founded on actual treaties and enforced positive law being established.54 The WTO is an 
example of the many organisations that tussle for space and attention on the global stage. 
 
The second aspect of development, and crux of the multilateral trading system, stemmed from 
the concept that countries could have the opportunity to mutually benefit from each other by 
facilitating freer trade.55 This meant the markets were more open and generally liberalised in 
the best interests of countries. The open market argument is supported by the promotion of 
cooperative economic ideas and the establishment of a rule–based system that intends to 
facilitate trade on an international level.56  
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Lastly, the third development dealt with the most contentious aspect – power.57 According to 
Van Grasstek, C the economic aspects of the multilateral trading system avoided the issue of 
who holds power.58 This was done to limit powerful nation’s attempts to influence the law as 
well as other smaller, developing nations. In the context of the previous hegemonies that 
dictated trade relationships, the system of linked, bilateral trade agreements that countries 
negotiated during the period of British hegemony was replaced by the United States (US) 
leadership of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which was the precursor 
to the WTO.59 These two powerful states assisted the establishment and enforcement of rules 
that granted judicial equality and economic opportunity to other states that would have 
previously been subject to one-sided policies. However, regardless of their intervention and 
assistance, the current practices of the WTO still favour developed countries despite their 
neutral policies.60  
 
International organisations, like the WTO, are premised around the creation and 
implementation of international law.61 In light of this, a review of their legal approach is of 
significance to this paper and a good point of departure.  It is worth noting that the legal duties 
of the WTO go beyond protecting and creating a stable multilateral trading system, attempting 
to achieve unity between states, and deterring countries from solely acting in their own 
interests.62 The legitimacy of the WTO is largely dependent on this mandate. Therefore, the 
WTO must not only enforce these rules but also create an extensive awareness in the hope of 
achieving a more efficient system.63 Thus, the argument put forward by proponents of the 
multilateral trade is that the best way to achieve a more efficient system is through negotiations 
and execution of treaties. Such an approach is aimed at being more open to accommodating 
both the developed and developing countries concerns.   
 
Thus, to further the above argument, the WTO possesses a certain paradoxical element; it 
aspires to uphold the principal of state sovereignty and simultaneously be a successful 
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international organisation.64 For an international organisation, like the WTO, it is imperative 
that the organisation facilitates cross border interaction and negotiations between countries. 
Interestingly, only in the last 150 years have states warmed up to the idea of a permanent, 
formal body being established that encroached on their principles of sovereignty and 
independence in negotiating mutually beneficial commitments.65 The founders of the 
multilateral trading system were also not too fond of international organisations and were 
champions of independence and sovereignty.66 They felt that organisations like the WTO 
require a level of subordination and compromised sovereignty in an unjustifiable manner.67 
Therefore, bridging the gap between international organisations and these principals was 
crucial to the development of the multilateral trading system and international law. The blurring 
of the principle of state sovereignty proved to be the main hindrance to the multilateral trading 
system’s development.68  
2.2.2 The GATT  
 
Before the formalisation of the WTO and the multilateral trade system, there were several 
moments of success and unfortunately also several failures that lead to the contemporary 
system. Therefore the build up to the WTO will be discussed in terms of developing countries, 
the relevant rounds of negotiations, and whether or not these negotiations included the issue of 
foreign direct investment. 
 
The Allied Powers at the end of the Second World War had the opportunity to redesign the 
world structure. They wished to create a post-war system of international organisations that 
shared the characteristics of their respective national governments.69 The United Nations 
General Assembly was intended to be the legislature, the International Criminal Court would 
be the judiciary and the World Bank and International Monetary Fund would be the equivalent 
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of a central bank.70 The International Trade Organisation (ITO) was intended to be the 
equivalent of a global trade ministry; however the ITO, like many of these institutions faced 
several hurdles, the dominant issue being state’s concern over their sovereignty.71 These 
concerns resulted in a limited set of goals being outlined and executed by its diplomats. 
Concepts like free trade and a liberal economic system was deemed unrealistic for the ITO.72  
 
One of the goals outlined by the ITO concerned the creation of a multilateral agreement on 
investment. This was prepared through the ITO when drafting the Havana Charter, with 
Articles 11 and 12 intended to address foreign investment; unfortunately the Havana Charter 
was never ratified.73 Had it been ratified the ITO would have played a decisive role in the 
framework of global investment.74  
 
The ITO’s failure in terms of investment was one of several reasons that initiated the move 
from multilateral to bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Post the Second World War BITs 
became the dominant approach to investment agreements. This was largely due to the fact that 
the agreements afforded substantial protection to foreign investors, specifically against the 
threat of expropriation.75 The ITO fell away soon after its conception, and countries turned to 
the GATT.76 Intended to be a temporary setup, the GATT formed the central point of reference 
for the multilateral trading system and a precursor to a new platform that promoted trade on an 
international scale. Essentially the GATT, despite never intending to span half a century, 
became the international platform for international trade.77  
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The GATT consisted of three key aspects, the first being the deepening of their tariff 
commitments by ensuring freer trade between members were possible, secondly the widening 
of their initial scope to accommodate broader issues and thirdly to increase the number of 
GATT contracting parties.78 As more developing countries realised the importance of trading 
with the rest of the world they joined the GATT as it grew from an institution of the few to 
include almost all trading nations by the end of the Uruguay Round (1986–1994) 
accommodating fully fledged contracting parties and parties in the process of accession.79  
 
Thus, for the half century that the GATT was active, foreign investment was not tabled as they 
(the GATT) maintained a distinct division between trade issues and investment.80 Only at the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations was investment introduced into the framework.81 
2.2.3 The build up to the Uruguay Round 
 
The founding of the GATT in 1947 was the first of its kind to create a common platform for 
international regulation. Founded predominantly by developed countries, certain developing 
countries such as Brazil and South Africa were also founding members.82 Despite this, for 
many years of negotiations before the Uruguay Round, trade was not deemed as an essential 
element to developing countries’ economic development.83 Therefore their lack of ambition in 
negotiating was evident in the minimal attention given to trading with other contracting parties 
of the GATT.84 Furthermore, these minimal interests were maintained by certain rules of the 
GATT; the first being that the major traders would negotiate together and present an agreement 
to the rest. Secondly only “principal suppliers” could adjust tariffs.85 
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As negotiations continued, through the 1960’s and 1970s the US initiated discussions on 
investment issues at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).86 
The OECD membership at the time consisted predominantly of developed nations; therefore 
the majority were in favour of a liberalised investment regime.87 The result of this liberal push 
was the ratification of certain codes; the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements and the 
Code of Liberalisation of Current Invisible Operations, which were promulgated to encourage 
member countries to reduce their restrictions on cross–border investment.88 The main 
deficiency with these c odes was the failure to include rights and obligations of foreign 
investors. Furthermore, developing countries, frustrated by the bullying tactics of foreign 
investors and the activity by developed countries, reacted by bringing investment issues before 
the United Nations (UN). The UN seemed a logical platform as they afforded all countries 
equal voting rights in the General Assembly (GA).89  
 
The frustration continued as issues concerning developing countries did not frequent the main 
agenda at the GATT negotiations before 1986.90 For example agricultural issues were either 
excluded or handled via long-term trade arrangements. The Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) 
handled all clothing and textiles concerns, and several developing countries maintained their 
special trading relationships with their former colonisers. Developing countries deemed these 
relationships far more beneficial in comparison to the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment 
under GATT. Therefore they had no incentive to actively participate in GATT negotiations.  
 
The Tokyo Round (1973 – 1979) coincided with developing countries move towards 
manufacturing as they were enjoying the benefits of negotiations.91 Despite their growth and 
rise in trade strength, the Tokyo negotiations were largely orientated around the European 
Union (EU) – US leadership. To the extent that the GATT was involved at a superficial level 
and developing countries’ interests were not addressed. Moreover, during the Round, despite 
developing countries growth, they were not ready to diversify and increase their exports.  
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2.2.4 The Uruguay Round (1986 – 1994) 
 
Developing countries at the start of the Uruguay Round were far more eager and willing to 
trade than in previous decades as trade was of greater importance to their economic 
development.92 Many countries had also prioritised and became dependent on exports and 
therefore needed to change to an outward approach. Moreover they had been able to assert 
themselves on a global scale and their trade had a new found significance in world markets.93 
It was recognised across the spectrum, for countries to obtain the concessions which they 
desired, they would first need to offer something in return. Essentially the Uruguay Round 
became a bargaining process for most.94 The levels of necessity during this process varied for 
developing nations based on their importance and attractiveness to developed countries.95 
During this round there was a clear interest in developing countries as developed countries 
pressured them to conform to the GATT’s rules to participate in all aspects of the agreement.96 
This culminated in the Uruguay Round being an unprecedented experience for many 
developing countries.   
 
A point worth mentioning is the unified approach taken by developing countries in terms of 
textiles and clothing. During the MFA negotiations developing countries realised that the 
pattern of successful exporters who dealt with rising costs and barriers would be repeated by 
new competitive exporters.97 Developing countries went on to seize the opportunity by pre-
empting these patterns and negotiating with other developing countries. This was at the expense 
of countries like China, who was not yet a contracting party of GATT, as well as other countries 
that were not politically tied to the current exporters.98 Developed countries, the importers, 
reacted by attempting to rally opposition to reduce potential losses; however the developing 
countries found solace and security in other developing countries.99 Unfortunately this united 
approach did not occur in agriculture with the food importing nations.  
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This united position then altered to an interest based approach. Initially developing countries 
did not entertain any inclusion of services in GATT; however during the negotiations certain 
advantages were identified.100 Developing countries saw this as an opportunity to rectify the 
issues of cheap labour and inefficient sectors. These advantages enticed various groups 
resulting in the unified approach not applying to developing countries and services.101 
Furthermore, on issues like subsidies, developing countries were included in the second stage 
of negotiations. The second stage traditionally involved the major countries and the inclusion 
of Brazil and India was significant.102  
 
In terms of foreign investment during the Uruguay Round of negotiations, by this stage the UN 
initiatives regarding investment lost momentum as several developing countries had incurred 
debilitating amounts of debt. The debt crisis of the 1980s became the justification for the World 
Bank’s structural adjustment of international investment towards a more liberalised 
approach.103 This resulted in developing countries being stranded without external sources of 
capital and were forced to welcome foreign investment out of necessity.104 
 
In the early 1980s the US once again lead the push for investment liberalisation, this time under 
the GATT.105 The US proposed a work program that included both trade related services and 
performance requirements that should be imposed on foreign investors.106 Developing 
countries like Brazil and India opposed the GATT entertaining any negotiations of that nature 
as it would be to the exclusive benefit of the US and other developed nations.107 It was this 
dissention that resulted in the ambiguities found in the GATT ruling on the Foreign Investment 
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Review Agency of Canada. This ruling ultimately paved the way for negotiations on TRIMS. 
The TRIMS Agreement will be discussed at a later stage of this paper.108  
 
Despite the little progress made in terms of investment, one of the primary issues was that the 
GATT was a contract and not an organisation; therefore countries could not be members but 
rather parties to a contract.109 This meant the commitments undertaken lacked definition due 
to the provisional nature of the agreements. These issues were compounded by the US attempts 
to expand the multilateral trading system to include issues such as investment, services and 
intellectual property rights.110 Despite the support of other developed countries, the general 
consensus was in favour of a new legal regime to implement a wider scope.111 This new legal 
basis was realised in the early 1990s with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round which gave 
birth to the WTO. Therefore, the platform was laid for the WTO to address issues of investment 
with the possibility of an investment orientated agreement being discussed.  
 
Thus one could argue that the birth of the WTO was viewed as a significant event in context 
of the political climate at the time. The WTO followed soon after the end of the Cold War and 
presented the opportunity to create new relationships between countries without the tension 
experienced during the GATT years.112 Moreover, the 1990s were viewed as the decade for 
international organisations to solidify alliances, lead the way in the global public’s interest and 
act according to the rule of law within a global society.113  
 
Despite the Cold War enthusiasm, the WTO did face substantial uphill in asserting themselves 
as it was to be the third attempt within the century to rework the world order.114 Moreover 
countries were concerned with the concept of global governance and the extent their national 
interests may be compromised.115 This was compounded by differing views on the role of 
international law in governing a country’s taxes, regulating their public goods and 
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redistributing their income, amongst other issues. These varying interpretations affected the 
development of the WTO as an institution.116   
 
The birth of the WTO coincided with the maximum number of BITs being negotiated, as well 
as the emergence of regional initiatives on investment liberalisations.117 The need for trade and 
investment liberalisation was at its greatest and most nations depended on investment to ensure 
their economic development.118 With this in mind the US, under the OECD, lead the way for 
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) with the intention of being a comprehensive 
binding investment treaty. It dealt with the three main aspects, investment liberalisation, 
protection of investors and dispute resolution.119 Eventually the MAI would to be taken over 
by the WTO as many felt it would be a better platform to enforce the dispute resolution 
mechanism.120 
 
As international support grew the mid-1990s were spent with the WTO intensifying efforts to 
establish a multilateral investment agreement. At the WTO ministerial conference in Singapore 
a proposal for multilateral negotiations on investment, as well as competition policy, 
government procurement and trade facilitation was tabled.121 Investment was a contentious 
issue as it offered many economic opportunities but was dependent on cross-border 
relationships.122 Once again India led the resistance which resulted in a compromise being 
reached.123 Furthermore, a Working Group on Trade and Investment was set up under the WTO 
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to review and analyse the relationship between investment and trade issues. The Working 
Group made slow progress at the WTO and certain issues were agreed upon such as investor 
protection, national treatment and the dispute resolution process. Despite this progress, certain 
issues and disagreements remained and could not be resolved within their deadlines.124 
 
2.3 The World Trade Organisation (WTO) 
 
The WTO’s birth came after much negotiation and balancing of interests and rights of 
developing and developed countries. With this foundation explained, the fundamental aspects 
of the WTO and its effect on developing countries will be dealt with. Special light will be shed 
on the development and focus on foreign investment during the WTO’s establishment until 
now.  
 
The WTO, unlike the GATT, deals with more than trade and started to trespass on issues dealt 
with by other international organisations.125 The WTO’s goal is to expand its scope and 
jurisdiction to issues such as intellectual property, textiles and public health. Despite the 
difficulties of creating a harmonious, all incorporating law, the WTO went ahead and 
broadened its scope as they felt the stature of the WTO would be able to empower and drive 
these issues.126 The WTO, as mentioned earlier, is prefaced on its open market policy127, 
therefore the organisation operates by extending the reach of the market across borders in order 
to create international division of labour.128 This is attractive to many countries as it allows 
them to specialise and focus on industries to which they are most suited.129  
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2.3.1 The framework of the WTO  
 
The WTO performs several functions and it is laid out in Article III of the Agreement 
Establishing the WTO. The first being the administration of the WTO agreements that lay down 
the legal rules for international commerce, as well as the codes of conduct for all WTO 
members. The WTO is expected to assist the implementation, administration and operation of 
the agreements so the objectives can be achieved.130 
 
The second proverbial hat the WTO wears, is as a permanent forum for multilateral trade 
negotiations. These forums entertain all matters covered by the WTO agreements, as well as 
new issues that are still being incorporated into existing agreements.131 The third functionary 
aspect of the WTO is settling of trade disputes. Much like the forum it provides for negotiations, 
the WTO acts as a forum for settling trade disputes between its members. Disputes arise when 
member countries are found to be acting in a manner that is inconsistent with the WTO 
commitments. In the event a mutually agreed solution is unreachable, members may turn to the 
dispute settlement forum.132 
 
With these functions laid out, it partially explains the basic principles of the trading system. As 
alluded to earlier, there are many WTO agreements and legal text that deal with a wide range 
of activities, such as agriculture, textiles and clothing as well as telecommunications to name 
a few. Upon reading the relevant documents one will see a consistent pattern of fundamental 
principles which form the foundation of the multilateral trading system. 133 
 
The first of these principle is that of trading without discrimination. The WTO promotes that 
under all WTO agreements, countries cannot normally discriminate between their trading 
partners. Therefore what may be offered to one partner must be offered to all. However an 
exception to this rule does exist, best known as the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle.134 
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conjunction it covers all three main areas of trade in terms of the WTO. 
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A continuation of this principle is that of national treatment. This entails that foreigners and 
locals must be treated equally when it comes to issues of trade. To give local products a fair 
chance, imported and locally-produced goods must be treated equally. This principle extends 
to foreign and domestic services and trademark issues.135 This is followed by the principle of 
promoting free trade via negotiations. Negotiations are conducted with the effort of lowering 
trade barriers to encourage trade. These barriers may take the form of custom duties and 
measures.136 
 
The WTO realised that the promise to not raise a trade barrier can be as important as lowering 
one as it gives the relevant trading parties clarity with regards to their investments, as well as 
other opportunities. This is the reason behind transparency and predictability constituting a 
basic trading principle. This principle creates stability, encourages investment, creates jobs and 
allows for consumers to have a choice when buying a product.  The Multilateral Trading 
System would not be able to exist without a stable foundation of consistency and 
predictability.137 Furthermore, the WTO is a proponent of fair competition as it is a basic 
principle of their trade agreements.138  
 
There is a clear link between freer trade and economic growth, therefore a core principle of 
WTO agreements is that of open trading. The WTO is aware that all countries regardless of 
their economic status possess assets that can be beneficial to domestic markets as well as to 
compete in overseas markets. The concept of comparative advantage reinforces this principle 
and state that countries benefit by first utilising their assets in order to concentrate on what they 
produce best. Once this is established they can then trade these products for similar products 
that other countries produce best.139 
 
The majority of the WTO Agreements were negotiated during the Uruguay Round and signed 
at the Marrakesh Ministerial Meeting in April 1994. This entailed approximately 60 decisions 
and agreements including a revised approach to the original GATT. The "Final Act Embodying 
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the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations" (the Final Act) signed 
in Marrakesh in 1994 is regarded to be the cover note to all the WTO Agreements. Everything 
else is attached to this.140 
 
The Final Act is followed by the Marrakesh Agreement, which deals with the scope, functions 
and structure of the WTO. It goes on to define the WTO’s relationship with other organisations, 
the handling of the budget, the duties of the secretariat, interpretation of legal text as well as 
decision making and the amendment procedure. Furthermore it deals with voting procedures, 
defines members and explains the accession of new members.141 
 
The multilateral trade agreements (Annexes 1, 2 and 3) are applicable to all members and as 
such are understood to be a single undertaking. In the Uruguay Round, contrary to previous 
rounds, a different approach was used known as the single undertaking. This is understood to 
be multilateral trade agreements that are accepted as a whole to bind all WTO members. The 
Schedules of Commitments also form part of the single undertaking.142 
 
Contrary to the single undertaking approach adopted for most agreements, four pluralilateral 
trade agreements were also negotiated during the Uruguay Round and apply only to members 
who agreed to be bound by them.143 There are several agreements that control the trade in 
goods, which are binding to all WTO members. These are known as the multilateral agreements 
on trade in goods. The first of these being the GATT 1994 which sets out the basic goods-
related obligations of WTO members; this agreement includes the provisions of the GATT 
1947 that have been rectified and amended. It also includes the protocols and certifications 
dealing with tariff concessions. As well as the protocols of accession and undertaking on the 
interpretation of GATT provisions.144  
 
The next agreement is the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS, which 
is also binding to all WTO Members, covers four modes of supply - from the perspective of an 
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importing country: cross border services; consumption abroad; commercial presence; and 
movement of natural persons.145 GATS at the end of the Uruguay Rounds called for further 
negotiation in respect of four service areas: namely financial services; basic 
telecommunications; movement of natural persons; and maritime transport.146 The former two 
area negotiations were closed in 1997 and movement of natural persons ended in 1995, whilst 
negotiations on maritime transport were also suspended. In respect of financial services, in 
March 1999 the Financial Services Agreement (FSA) came into effect.147 It covers a range of 
financial services and approximately 95 per cent of global trade in these services. 148 Despite it 
creating a comprehensive legal structure for market access; cross-border trade and dispute 
settlement mechanisms149 numerous countries have failed to exercise its varying reforms.150  
 
This is followed by the Agreement on Trade – Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
(TRIPS). The objective of the TRIPS agreement are understood to be; (i) the reduction of 
distortions and impediments to international trade; (ii) the promotion of effective and adequate 
protection of intellectual property rights; (iii) ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to trade. 151 The aim of these 
rights is to contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and transfer of technology. 
Furthermore the TRIPS agreement is also binding on all WTO Members. 
 
As discussed earlier the WTO acts as a forum for the settling of trade disputes between its 
members. The rules and procedures of the WTO dispute settlement system are embodied in the 
"Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes" (the DSU), 
which applies to all WTO Members.152 
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Lastly, there is the Trade Policy Review (TPRM), the purpose of TPRM is to improve and 
ensure adherence of all members to the rules and obligations that have been committed too 
under the Multilateral Trading System and the Plural Lateral Trading System. This improves 
efficiency and promotes transparency across the organisation. The review mechanism 
facilitates the evaluation of all members’ activities within the organisation and at a domestic 
level. This assessment is conducted in context of the wider economic and developmental needs, 
policies and objectives of the members concerned.153 
2.3.2 Developing countries and the WTO 
 
Due to the seismic shift in the geopolitical structure of world power, developing countries find 
themselves in a position of power that is foreign to all parties involved. This means developing 
countries now have the ability to negotiate, assert and protect their interests and resources. 
Developing countries have become a necessity to developed countries and international 
systems alike who wish to include them in their various negotiations.154 With this in mind 
developing countries’ needs to assess how best they may balance their domestic needs with 
their international aspirations. International organisations, like the WTO, in their attempt to 
have a truly global impact, have realised the need to include developing countries in their 
negotiations and accommodate traditionally “weaker” members with varied interests.155 
Despite the principles of the WTO, the implementation and practice in terms of developing 
countries is questionable. 
 
Developing countries, like South Africa, are faced with critical questions that must be 
addressed; the first being what are its policy objectives in terms of development on a domestic 
and international level.156 Secondly, how can economic growth be stimulated and directly 
contribute to the overall development.157 In terms of cross-border relations, developing 
countries need to set out their objectives clearly and establish a mutually beneficial framework 
via negotiations.158 This may involve altering trading patterns, reducing of tariffs and altering 
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their general economic structure. This must be done in a manner that does not compromise 
their policy framework and on-going trade negotiations.159  
 
Historically trade negotiations for developing countries have not been fruitful. Their lack of 
natural and government resources hindered their activity and effectiveness in the WTO. 
Moreover, the technical nature of negotiations presented certain difficulties160 and the 
negotiations have failed to show many developing countries the benefits of trade 
liberalisation.161 Much to the frustration of many of the developing nations an imbalance of 
power still exists within and around the WTO. This stems largely from the fact that the WTO 
has faced difficulty in accommodating trade issues concerning investment.162  
 
2.3.3 Post Uruguay Round 
 
The developing countries that were active during the Uruguay Round maintained their 
momentum and participated in the various committees163 established post the Uruguay 
Round.164 The countries that had not negotiated started to participate in the implementation 
aspects. Furthermore, existing alliances were maintained with the emergence of one new 
grouping of small island countries who wished to assist themselves in terms of costs and 
implementation issues.165  
2.3.3.1 Seattle Ministerial Conference 
 
The end of the 20th century witnessed the Uruguay commitment to reopen agriculture and 
services negotiations come to fruition with a new Round being established to deal with these 
issues. Moreover these preparations allowed for further advancements in formalising 
procedures which had not taken place in previous Rounds. The lessons learnt from the Tokyo, 
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Uruguay and Singapore Rounds motivated the move to define the agenda.166 Furthermore the 
fall out between the EU and the US had stressed negotiations across the table as these former 
hegemonies failed to reach an agreement regarding intellectual property, agriculture and the 
extension of the WTO rules.167 This formed the backdrop that developing countries had to 
contend with when preparing for a potential new round of negotiations.   
 
Developing countries were extremely willing to be involved for several reasons; the first being 
that several countries did not want to lose their momentum and economic benefits that came 
from their active participation.168 Secondly, these countries had realised the cost of their lack 
of inactivity during negotiations and did not wish to lose out, again. Lastly, developing 
countries’ governments faced domestic pressure to participate and represent their country’s 
best economic interests.169  
 
Thus, in the final preparations for the Seattle Round efforts were made for all countries to be 
included in the consultation concerning the agenda for negotiations. The agenda was orientated 
around the liberalization in industrial products, as well as the Uruguay Round agenda which 
includes negotiations in agriculture and services. To avoid discrimination and remain 
diplomatic the majority of countries’ interests were included and those that were excluded 
could be challenged.170 The Chair of the Ministerial meeting in Seattle, the US, decided to 
designate an informal group to establish the agenda. This group was better known as the “Green 
Room”.171  
 
The problem with this group stemmed from the lack of formality when challenging the group’s 
decisions. In light of this, developing countries refused to accept the results and questioned the 
legitimacy of the procedure. It was issues of this nature, amongst other aspects, that resulted in 
the stale-mate and failure to reach a consensus at the Seattle Ministerial. Despite its failure the 
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resistance from developing countries reflected a shift in the balance of power since the Uruguay 
Round of negotiations.172 
 
Between the Seattle and Doha Rounds many of the developing countries had established 
regional alliances. Alliances were formed in Africa, the Caribbean and in Latin America.173 
These alliances provided experience in terms of negotiations and assisted in prioritising which 
issues to table. The Southern African countries had to approach negotiations taking into 
consideration the interests of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and even 
more the relationship between SADC and the EU as there were many existing bilateral 
agreements between these parties that were still in place at the time.174  
2.3.3.2 The Doha Round of negotiations 
 
Most countries approached the Doha Round with one issue on their mind, agriculture, in terms 
of both services and investment. Even though this area is not the primary focus of the research 
– the actions of developing countries in respect to this particular issue is important as it forms 
the backbone of trading for many developing countries. Despite the on-going negotiations there 
was little expectation of success without a greater ministerial initiative. The EU’s efforts to 
protect its rule on subsidies and to obtain recognition that agriculture may be used for social 
and environmental purposes was defeated by a general alliance of developed and developing 
countries who opposed the EU’s approach.175 This anti-subsidy lobbying by the developing 
countries was a significant achievement. Furthermore their presence in the general alliance was 
clear and it reflected in the concessions they received in areas crucial to their development.176 
 
The next achievement in agriculture came in terms of special and differential treatment. In a 
move that many say is a shift back to pre-Uruguay round position, special and differential 
treatment was acknowledged as crucial to agricultural negotiations and agreements.177 The 
Doha round also extended the time afforded to Least Developed Countries (LDCs) to comply 
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with issues of subsidies and intellectual property.178 These victories were important to the 
position of developing countries and could be attributed to the initial discussions and informal 
negotiations in preparation for the Doha Round.179  
 
It is worth noting, that in comparison to the Uruguay Round, the Doha Round was far better 
equipped to take a progressive stance on services during negotiations. Members agreed to 
continue with the existing foundation and maintain their early deadlines. In terms of labour 
services many expected progress that would allow these services to be extended across 
countries’ borders.180 However this was met with resistance due to several considerations, such 
as security, that halted the progress of labour services.181 The next challenge under services 
was the issue of implementation which became circular. Developed countries were accused of 
failing to complete their obligations whilst developing countries required more time to meet 
theirs.182 The token section on implementation in the Declaration and the lack of enforcement 
of contractual commitments counted as a defeat for the developing countries’ objectives.183 
There were subjective victories in terms of intellectual property and on the general rules; 
however they had no real bearing on the status of developing countries in the WTO.184 They 
(developing countries) had also suffered a defeat on the environmental front as the roles they 
will play in negotiations were left open-ended with their participation unknown.185  
 
The success of developing countries participation in the Doha Round must be looked at in 
context of their relative weaker infrastructure when compared to the developed countries. In 
this context these victories are important. They were successful in several of their declared 
priorities and subsequently managed to obtain personal achievements that had the potential to 
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improve their economic development.186 Despite the condescending tone of several developed 
countries who underestimated the fight within the developing countries, their resistance and 
stubbornness was rewarded. Furthermore the developing countries grew and learnt from each 
round of negotiations.  
 
In terms of investment, despite the exponential number of bilateral and multilateral treaties 
relating to foreign investment being established by the time of the Doha Round, no multilateral 
investment regime existed. This was acknowledged by the Doha Development Agenda who 
have committed to creating a multilateral framework for transparency and predictability that 
ensures long term foreign investment.187 However, this is as far as investment has been dealt 
with. In December 2013, the Ninth Ministerial Conference of the WTO convened in Bali, 
Indonesia, with negotiations focused on the lowering of trade barriers. The negotiations 
produce the Bali Package188 trade agreement.  
 
2.4 WTO Agreements incorporations of foreign investment 
 
Under the present WTO regime, no extensive multilateral agreement on investment exists. 
During the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations however, investment-centred provisions 
were introduced in the TRIMS Agreement and the GATS.189 
 
The former agreement, TRIMs, came into effect on 1 January 1995 and was enacted so as to 
deal with trade related investment measures.190 It did not define what trade-related investment 
measures were involved but was included in the Uruguay Round due to pressure from 
developed nations much to the dismay of developing nations.191 This opposition was due to the 
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agreement providing a list by which to abolish investment measures which adversely affected 
trade, a move which developing nations viewed as vital to their economic development.192  
In respect of its contents, the TRIMs agreement reaffirmed Articles III (National Treatment) 
and XI (Prohibition of Quantitative Restrictions) of the GATT. It further went on to introduce 
standstill and rollback mechanisms in respect on trade balancing; foreign exchange balancing 
and local content rules.193 Due to a number of developed and developing countries using pre-
existing investment incentives and performance requirements, the Agreement did not deal with 
the issue of export performance requirements.194 
 
To monitor and manage the implementation and execution of the TRIMs agreement, a 
committee tasked with doing so was established. Member countries were provided with 90 
days within which to inform such committee of any existing TRIMs and where thereafter 
awarded a transition period within which to terminate the declared TRIMs.195 The length of the 
awarded transition period was dependant on whether the country at hand was classed as 
developed or developing – developed countries were awarded 2 years; developing countries, 5 
years; and the least developed, seven years.196 The latter classes were also granted the ability 
to apply for extensions on the transition periods.197 However, in terms of applying the TRIMs 
agreement, all countries are expected to comply with TRIMs upon accession without any 
transition period being awarded or applied for.198 Apart from the aforementioned concessions, 
developing countries are also granted certain exemptions which permit them to deviate 
temporarily from the agreement due to any balance-on-payment problems.199 As with all 
agreements, the TRIMs agreement has also been subject to disputes. Such disputes are 
governed by the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) and are thereby resolved 
according to the same settlement mechanism.200 
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The latter Uruguay Round agreement, GATS, is the first agreement on trade and investment in 
services which is both multilateral and legally enforceable. It sets out the obligations for trade 
in services and deals with over 160 different service activities, including energy; education and 
banking.201 The aim of the agreement is to eliminate government measures which inhibit 
services from trading freely across national borders or which ignore locally established service 
firms which are foreign owned.202 To implement this aim, GATS has built in the right of 
establishment, by which service providers may establish a commercial presence in sectors 
which countries have entered into certain commitments.203 By introducing this right, the GATS 
has established itself as an indirect investment agreement and has opened up both commercial 
services and vital social services to foreign investment.204  
 
GATS further incorporate three principles, namely market access; the MFN principle and 
national treatment.205 The former refers to a situation whereby a country is obliged to allow 
international service suppliers to enter their markets, whilst the latter refers to the treating such 
suppliers under the same terms and conditions as local suppliers.206 MFN in turn provides that 
a country must treat service providers from all member countries alike. The application of these 
and other principles differ however, in that some are to be followed automatically whilst others 
are only applicable once they have been specifically included in a member country’s schedule 
of commitments.207 The former approach is known as negative or top down listing whilst the 
latter is known as positive or bottom up listing.208 These varying approaches have created the 
impression that GATS is a flexible agreement. Whilst this may hold true for some, developing 
nations have not been privy to much of this flexibility given that they are often obliged, due to 
uneven power relations, to take on greater commitments.209  
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Unlike the TRIMs Agreement, the GATS only came into effect in 2000.210 This was due to 
several member countries’ desire to keep it out of the WTO purview.211 After much negotiation 
however, it became a part of the WTO, with all member countries being signatories of its 
framework and with each having made varying commitments to the different service areas.212 
The US and EU have extended the GATS’ scope through such negotiation, whilst developing 
countries have called for safeguards to be introduced into it, ensuring that their domestic 
entities are not placed under threat by global service providers.213 
 
Apart from TRIMs and GATS, the WTO has also introduced TRIPS – Trade Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights Agreement. It aims to liberalize investment policies by 
introducing the protection of the intangible asset of intellectual property. 214 The WTO is 
currently in the process of examining issues relating to trade and investments by way of a 
Working Group on Trade and Investment. This Group was formed in 1996 and is tasked with 
examining the varying aspects of investments. Their mandate is exploratory and analytical 




This chapter consisted of two dominant themes; the first being developing countries and the 
challenges faced by them in WTO, with the second theme being the extent to which the WTO 
has given attention to investment. In terms of the former, developing countries have had a 
consistently difficult time asserting their needs during the rounds of negotiations. In principle 
the WTO is worthy of the time of all its member countries, especially developing countries 
who stand to benefit from the MFN and single undertaking principles. However, in practice, 
the WTO has consistently favoured the developed countries. Due to the nature of the WTO and 
the manner it was founded, developing countries have always been at disadvantage. The core 
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principles of the WTO, such as the open market policy, have favoured the more developed 
nations with the principles being used as a justification to access developing countries’ markets 
and materials.  
 
The second theme of the chapter was the extent and manner in which investment has developed 
in the multilateral trading system, specifically whether the WTO gave investment the necessary 
credence. Investment has only come to the fore in the last 20 years due to political and 
economic reasons that did not allow for investment to grow within the multilateral trading 
system. Under the WTO, investment has been dealt with via the TRIMS and GATS 
respectively. However, in light of the growing need for investment and the substantial 
development that investment can create, especially for developing countries, a new multilateral 
investment agreement should be considered. 
 
The next chapter will build on this discussion by focusing on the development of FDI on a 
South African level, and transporting these principles to a discussion on South Africa’s new 





















3. IN WHAT MANNER HAS SOUTH AFRICA DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF 
INVESTMENTS, IN LIGHT OF THE CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL STRUCTURE 
      
3.1 Introduction 
 
As the previous chapters have alluded to, developing countries take varied approaches in 
achieving economic growth and stability. For many emerging economies Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) is considered a progressive and profitable avenue. More so, because FDI 
assists the development of new infrastructure, provides capacity for growth and facilitates the 
exchange of skills and technology, especially in terms of the newer forms of capital inputs that 
cannot be achieved through trading.216 It also promotes competition in the domestic market by 
allowing essentially the same product of varying quality to be sold simultaneously. In addition, 
in respect of the labour market, host nations gain employee training in creating and operating 
new businesses.217 
 
The perks of FDI must be looked at in the context of the African continent which is overflowing 
with investment potential and thus been able to expand the interest of the developed world. 
This interest has taken the form of a rapid increase in FDI, with countries and unions laying a 
foundation in Africa to be perfectly poised to capitalise on the continent’s potential.218 Being 
the world’s second largest continent and possessing a rich variety of resources it is the 
opportune time for African countries to seize this opportunity by maximising on the abundance 
of international interest, specifically via foreign investment.219  
 
Since African countries, and specifically South Africa, are indeed gaining the interest of the 
developed world, the objective of this chapter is to specifically analyse the manner in which 
South Africa has been dealing with issues pertaining to investment, in light of the changing 
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world order. In order to assess the country’s progress, this chapter will firstly underline the 
various reasons relating to the importance of attracting foreign investment to South Africa. 
Secondly, a critical analysis of FDI in South Africa will be provided, including an historical 
overview of the country’s investment relations, measures and development. Thirdly, with the 
context and foundation laid out, the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill will be 
dissected to ascertain the possible benefits and drawbacks that it contains, as well as it’s 
potential to be improved upon. 
 
3.2 The need for South Africa to attract foreign investment 
 
There has been much technological, agricultural and business innovation across the continent. 
Thus, international businesses attention has taken the form of an increasing number of 
international companies establishing business premises across the continent, furthermore a 
number of banks have also taken an interest resulting in stronger stock market performances.220 
All of which has contributed to economic growth across the continent, and importantly in South 
Africa.221 
 
Thus, it has become apparent that economic growth and stability are important factors that will 
encourage consistent foreign investment in Africa, and particularly South Africa. The process 
of encouraging foreign investment must always be to promote and preserve democracy and not 
jeopardise the democratic process of the host country. This is important as Africa cannot allow 
itself to be stripped of its riches for a second time.222 Therefore, in achieving consistent growth, 
the approach to foreign investment needs to avoid the colonialist theme of Western powers 
benefitting from the land at the expense of the locals.223 In other words, in attracting FDI there 
needs to be an equitable approach where all parties benefit. 
 
This spotlight on Africa has taken the form of FDI, with emerging powers such as China and 
India, as well as established super powers like the US increasing their FDI involvement in 
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Africa.224 China and India are pursuing strategies that go beyond natural resources, which 
include: fast growing modernising industries as both economies have burgeoning middle 
classes that represent growth and purchasing power.225 It is this hunger that has resulted in 
these countries buying Africa’s light manufactured products, household consumer goods, 
processed foods, telecommunications and tourism facilities.226 This places South Africa in an 
advantageous position as it remains one of Africa’s biggest economies and in context of the 
rest of the continent, it provides a far more stable investment prospect.227  
 
Despite this, if South Africa wishes to catch up with other developing countries, it needs to 
make a greater effort in attracting FDI and empowering the economy. There is a strong 
relationship between economic growth and foreign investment, and a greater level of 
investment ensures sustainable growth rates which create massive incentives for South Africa 
in attracting FDI.  
 
Interestingly, the AT Kearney FDI confidence index of the world’s leading multinational 
corporations showed that South Africa moved from 15th place to 13th place.228 The top 10 
countries together all attract half of all global FDI which amounted to $1.4 Trillion in 2012. 
The index further indicated that South Africa in 2013 saw their FDI double to $10 billion, 
which is more than six times less than fifth placed Brazil.229 The US was firmly seated in the 
number one spot, followed by China, with India, Australia and Singapore all in the top 10. 
Interestingly, Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) rose to 11th spot as it acts as an 
investment hub for the Middle East and Africa.230 The simple lesson from this index is that 
South Africa should be attracting improved numbers in terms of FDI. 
 
To add to this, experts from AT Kearney attribute successful attraction of FDI to structured 
programmes that are implemented on a state level. They go on to explain that these programmes 
introduces diversity to manufacturing, additional skills, improved economic development and 
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increased productivity which results in job creation. They went on to suggest that FDI would 
be the ideal approach for South Africa to compensate for its low savings rate and to increase 
employment and incomes.231 South Africa is also the largest producer of platinum - despite not 
producing consistently at the moment - they also have a large mineral base, accompanied by 
one of the most sophisticated banking systems on the continent and are viewed as a gateway to 
Africa. 
 
In light of these opportunities, the Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill in conjunction 
with South Africa’s membership to the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 
alliance is evident of South Africa’s attempts to improve and encourage FDI. However there 
are certain aspects of the Bill that have investors apprehensive. It is argued that the Bill has 
been drafted in light of the grievances felt by the South African government in applying the 
previous approach to FDI. Therefore, it would seem appropriate to discuss a brief history of 
South Africa’s approach to foreign investment. 
3.3 The history of South Africa’s approach to foreign investment 
 
Foreign investment has a complex and lengthy history in South Africa, dating back to the 17th 
Century when the first European colonialists settled in the country. Before their establishment, 
the economy was orientated around agricultural exports, specifically maize and fruit, to Europe 
with dominance from London based banks.232 Moreover, the major mineral deposits, firstly 
with diamonds and later with gold, became the catalyst in the industrial advancements and 
development.233 These key developments in the sector led to the creation of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange, which in turn stimulated domestic growth and re-investment of mining 
profits.234  
 
However, the turn of the century witnessed a greater focus on manufacturing development, 
with investments from the United Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA) and 
Europe promoting growth of new industrial sectors.235 Despite difficulties felt across the board 
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during World War Two, post the war, FDI continued to flow into mining, specifically aspects 
of manufacturing and services in other services. By the 1970s, approximately 40 per cent of 
FDI stock was in manufacturing and only 15 per cent in mining.236  
 
From the 1970s onwards FDI into South Africa decreased. This was mainly due to the pressure 
put on investors by their home countries in light of the apartheid regime.237 The growing 
international campaigns, such as the Anti–Apartheid Movement and the rallies of the African 
National Congress (ANC), as well as international sanctions imposed on South Africa made it 
extremely difficult for investors to interact with South Africa on any level.238 As the campaigns 
intensified, the political instability of South Africa’s resulted in the country’s economy to 
suffer. The political instability lead to an exodus of foreign investors in the 1980s with a large 
number of US and UK firms departing. Despite the large number of firms dissociating 
themselves with South Africa up to 450 firms still remained.239  
 
The early 1990s saw the end of the apartheid regime, with bans on key organisations such as 
the ANC being lifted.240 Constitutional negotiations took precedence with the end result being 
a date set for South Africa’s first democratic election in 1994. These factors did contribute in 
renewed interest in the country, as an investment opportunity. Thus, South Africa’s FDI rebirth 
was initiated with existing inflows of prior investment dictating the composition of inflows 
during the 1990s.241 
 
The renewed interest in a democratic South Africa was further enhanced by the country’s 
joining of key international organisations and ratifying of strategic international agreements.242 
The sense of political and economic stability catapulted the country as a promising investment 
opportunity. Moreover, the country’s implementation of legislation and policies that were pro-
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investment also had a significant impact. In support of this South Africa introduced a general 
liberalisation of the local markets with the intention of encouraging new foreign investment. 
The importance of FDI was clearly recognised by the South African government243 and was 
reinforced by the implementation of the Growth Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
policy being introduced and implemented in 1996. GEAR applied FDI as the dominant form 
of solving the saving shortages faced by the new government.244  
 
To expand on GEAR briefly, there were two key economic policies of the post-Apartheid 
government in South Africa. The first being the Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) established in 1994 and GEAR which followed two years later.245 The RDP aimed to 
improve service delivery to the poor and create an environment conducive to social 
development. GEAR on the other hand, was a neoclassical macroeconomic stabilisation policy. 
In terms of the GEAR policy measures, there were both fiscal and monetary policies. In terms 
of fiscal policy, GEAR was intended to establish a quick deficit reduction, a cut back in 
government expenditure, and to reduce the tax of the Gross Domestic Profit (GDP).246 In terms 
of Monetary Policy, GEAR intended to tighten monetary policy and create a gradual relaxation 
of exchange controls.247 
 
Moreover, South Africa needed to prove to the world, despite its turbulent history and 
neighbouring nation’s lack of stability, that it was a stable political country ready to interact 
with foreign investors on a profitable basis.248 In light of this, bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs)249 were the best system to safeguard foreign investments and formed a key factor behind 
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South Africa engaging in BITs with several capital exporting nations.250 However, most of 
these treaties were signed before the final Constitution was ratified. This is important to note 
as any renegotiations that would occur would have to be executed in light of the Constitution.251 
Unlike the original BITs that were negotiated under the Organisation for Economic and Co-
operative Development (OECD) template252, these BITs were orientated around the protection 
of the foreign investor, leaving the government with limited space to manoeuvre.253 In light of 
this, the South African government has been strategizing a new approach that will offer greater 
protection for them. 
 
3.4 The Governments Review of Investment Policy 
 
South Africa post 1994 has had an open FDI regime. This means their approach does not 
control inward investment unless it deals with competition regulation in terms of mergers and 
acquisitions.254 The Wal-Mart / Massmart takeover255 was a lesson for South Africa as it proved 
that the BIT framework caused the regulatory stagnation and ultimately  became the catalyst 
for the revision of all BITs (pre-2007) in 2007. The BITs between South Africa and European 
powers started to exhibit their draw backs by limiting the government’s policy space and 
bypassing the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) programme.256 Unfortunately, the open 
regime of investment yielded mediocre outcomes and resulted in a new approach being tabled 
in dealing with inward FDI. 
 
                                                          
- Investments from a contracting state shall be subject to fair and equitable treatment. 
- Investments by investors from a contracting state will not be expropriated or nationalised unless this is in 
the public interest and compensation equal to the fair market value of the investment is paid.  
- Disputes between an investor from a contracting state and other contracting state will be resolved by 
international arbitration; for example under the rules of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment disputes (ICSID).  
250 Azimpheleli Langalanga, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulation: A revisit by Azimpheleli Langalanga’, 
available at http://blogaila.com, accessed on 14 July 2014 
251 Ibid 
252 www.oecd-library.org, accessed on 12 September 2014 
253 Azimpheleli Langalanga, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulation: A revisit by Azimpheleli Langalanga’, 
available at http://blogaila.com, accessed on 14 July 2014 
254 Azimpheleli Langalanga, ‘South Africa’s Foreign Investment Regulation: A revisit by Azimpheleli Langalanga’, 
available at http://blogaila.com, accessed on 14 July 2014 
255 www.bowman.co.za, accessed on 17 September  2014 
256 Piero Foresti, Laura de Carli & Others v The Republic of South Africa ICSID Case No ARB (AF)/07/01 
49 
 
Another contentious matter was whether South Africa’s Constitution was broad enough to 
protect private property involved in foreign investments.257 In the event it was, it meant that 
the issue of expropriation would be compromised - which is problematic as it forms a key 
feature of the new Investment Bill. This will be explained in context of the Investment Bill 
later in this chapter. Arguably the most influential factor was the limitation of the government’s 
policies.258 As briefly mentioned earlier, the Black Economic Empowerment programme was 
included and enforced in all BITs treaties. Foreign investors were not fond of these compliance 
requirements as they felt that it affected their efficiency and profit margins. Foreign investors 
felt that such compliance went against the best interests of their investment. They therefore 
would attempt to avoid having to satisfy the compliance requirements.259 The very 
requirements investors tried to circumvent, formed the backbone of their macro-economic and 
social reform that the South African government implemented, it was therefore crucial that 
these policies were not circumvented or compromised.260   
 
In light of this, South Africa has drawn much attention, both negative and positive, due to their 
alternate approach to foreign investment. In recent times, they have elected to terminate all first 
generation BITs with the European Union.261 Most of the BITs were with major capital nations 
such as Germany and the UK. These BITs were to expire soon and thus South Africa chose not 
to renew them. This decision not to renew these longstanding BITs did cause concern for 
investors. The investor’s apprehension largely stemmed from the alternate approach which was 
to be taken by the South African government.262 
 
The government’s decision has drawn criticism from various sectors, including the European 
Union which is South Africa’s largest trading partner and source of FDI. South Africa could 
take some solace from the fact that other countries, including Australia and India, are currently 
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reviewing their investment policies and BITs for similar reasons. Interestingly, South Africa 
still has 45 BITs, of which only 17 are still in force. Of the remaining 28, 17 are with African 
countries and others include similar developing nations such as Russia and Canada.263  
 
3.5 The way forward: An analysis of The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill 
 
As alluded to above, South Africa’s decision not to renew the BITs has been met with concerns 
by investors of those countries who shared BITs with South Africa. This is understandable as 
these BITs have formed a large basis of the trading relationship shared between South Africa 
and the corresponding countries. However, it submitted that these countries’ concerns may not 
be as serious as initially purported and a comprehensive understanding of the Bill may ease 
investor’s worries. The country’s new approach to FDI is a twofold process encompassing: 
 firstly, the termination of BITs with several countries; and  
 secondly, the introduction of the greatly anticipated Protection and Promotion of 
Investment Bill.264  
 
The FDI Bill is intended to bring with it a new era for Southern African investment, an era that 
allows South Africa to regulate investment separately from the international arena. The 
objective of the bill is to establish a balance between the interests of the host nation and the 
foreign investor.265  
 
To understand the Investment Bill and the implications for all parties involved, and whether it 
should be enacted in its current form, it is important to understand the relationship between 
South African law and International law. In respect of the relationship between municipal and 
international law, South Africa adheres to the dualist approach. This approach emphasises that 
the municipal law and international law are two distinct systems of law and each has application 
in its own sphere. However, those proposing this theory conceded that in the event of conflict 
between the two systems – the municipal law which is a reflection of the sovereignty of the 
state would prevail. The principle of state sovereignty is based on the idea that a state must 
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implement laws/policies that suits the national needs of the state. It is of interest to note that in 
particular, the South African government’s reason for the withdrawal of the BITs was that it 
wanted to provide more sustainable protection to its own interest. Further, the South Africa 
Constitution266 states that when interpreted, courts must consider international law as per 
section 39(1)(b), the result being that courts refer to international law whenever relevant and 
necessary.267  
 
Furthermore, the Bill of Rights268, Chapter 2 of the Constitution, protects the rights of all 
persons in South Africa, and creates an obligation for the state to respect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill.269 This is important in terms of FDI, as it provides equal protection to 
foreign investors and citizens alike. The Bill of Rights further upholds the practice of 
Affirmative Action measures taken in context of the principle of equality. This is a point of 
interest as Affirmative Action has been an issue for foreign investors who do not wish to 
comply with the practice.270 Moreover, investment law by nature is deeply rooted in 
international law, thus the Investment Bill encompasses both domestic and international law.  
 
In light of the constitutional objectives and nature of FDI, the Investment Bill is South Africa’s 
attempt to afford itself more space to apply its transformation agenda and industrial policies 
whilst working towards a consistent realisation of socio–economic rights for its citizens.271 In 
many ways the Bill appears to be on the right track, however key provisions relating to 
expropriation, compensation, national treatment, rights of establishment and dispute settlement 
still require attention. These provisions require a fragile balance between domestic and 
international law.272 The analysis which follows therefore encompasses a comparison between 
the substantive provisions of the Bill in light of international law principles and the 
Constitution.273 Due to the important implications that the Bill will have on South Africa’s 
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foreign investor relations, it is trite for this dissertation to provide an in-depth analysis of the 
relevant provisions as a means to ascertain the envisaged operation and possible implications 
of the Bill. It is important to note, that due to the tentative nature of the Bill certain aspects of 




The preamble is necessary to ascertain the objective and intention of the legislator in drafting 
the legislation. More so, it plays an important role as a point of reference and departure for 
courts and tribunals. In terms of the Investment Bill, the preamble recognises that the 
Investment Bill is conscious of the Bill of Rights, whilst simultaneously recognising the 
importance of investment for economic growth. It goes on to affirm the State’s commitment to 
creating a transparent and certain business environment suitable for the promotion and 
protection of all investments. 
 
As per the wording, the preamble attempts to balance the need for investment and South 
Africa’s constitutional objectives of equal treatment and opportunities.274 This is in keeping 
with the government’s desires of acting in the public’s interest to avoid repeating previous 
mistakes made in implementing BITs.275 In light of this, the need to constitutionalise 
investment regulation has not come as a great surprise.  
 
A notable feature of the preamble is the principle of “public interest”.  This term has an 
extremely wide meaning leading to both profitable and detrimental consequences.276 There is 
a need for clarity via a statutory definition. Establishing a single definition of the term will ease 




                                                          
274 The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 
275 These mistakes refer to when the government entered into BITs before finalising the Constitution. 
276 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill Submission to the Department of Trade and Industry’, available 






The Bill contains a definition of “investment” that is a good, simple definition that 
accommodates the lay man’s understanding as well as incorporating contractual rights.278 This 
progressive definition is a codification of the Salini Test.279 Furthermore, it appears to do away 
with any form of speculative investments.280  
 
The definition requires the investment to relate to an economic investment that would be 
regarded as material or significant, therefore underlying a physical presence in South Africa. 
One way of viewing this, is that the Bill does not deal with speculative investments or that the 
Bill excludes foreign investment of that nature.281 Based on this presumption, local law would 
have to deal with such investments. This uncertainty may be problematic for already sensitive 
investors as it will only add to their fears and discourage future investment.  
 
Furthermore, section 4(1) states that the Bill applies to investments made “for commercial 
purposes”.282 This term is undefined. The implication may be that “non–commercial” 
investments would be to the exclusion of foreigners who wish to purchase property for their 
personal use.283 Section 5 adds further requirements that must be met for an investment to 
qualify for protection under the Bill, stating that the investment must be found to be “in 
accordance with the applicable legislation” and was “acquired and used in expectation and for 
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the purpose of the economic activity or other business purposes”.284 Once again there is no 
clarity as to the application of these requirements creating further uncertainty which in turn 
discourages investment.  
3.5.3 Interpretation Clause 
 
The importance of the clause is reasonably clear in prescribing the manner and understanding 
of the Bill. As a constitutionally supreme country, the Bill will be interpreted in accordance 
with firstly the Constitution285 and secondly with international law.286 Therefore any aspect of 
international law that is found to be inconsistent with the Constitution287 then it cannot be 
applicable.288 
 
Additionally, the Bill states that it should be interpreted in line with customary international 
law consistent with the Constitution.289 Furthermore, it is expected that customary international 
law has been read into the Bill. This may limit customary international law which is 
problematic.290 There is a likelihood that a large portion of international investment law 
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principles will be contrary to the Bill and therefore not be applicable. One such example is the 
issue of dispute resolution that prior to the Bill would take place before an ICSID tribunal, 
however under the Bill will take place within the South African legal system. The result of this 
being South Africa may have a Bill that does not apply substantial international law principles, 
therefore leaving investors feeling vulnerable.291 
 
3.5.4 Protection of sovereign rights 
 
The Bill is largely positioned on protecting the sovereign rights of the South African 
government to act in the “public interest”.292  Section 3 provides that the intention of the Bill 
is to promote and protect investment in “a manner consistent with public interest between the 
rights and obligations of investors” as well as ensuring equal treatment between South Africa 
and foreign investors by applying “subject to applicable legislation”.293  
 
Section 5 states that the Bill applies to investments made for commercial purposes as well as 
to investments made before and after the promulgation of the Bill. It is applicable regardless 
of whether the source of investment is public or private, or from a local or foreign origin. 
Furthermore, the Bill will consider any other relevant domestic legislation and will not preclude 
measures taken by any organ of state in terms of section 10. Furthermore, section 4 does not 
preclude domestic law and section 5(3) subjects all protection of foreign investment to comply 
with applicable domestic laws and international agreements.294  
 
Section 10 allows the government to redress “historical, social and economic inequalities” to 
“promote and preserve cultural heritage and practices and indigenous knowledge” in an attempt 
to “foster beneficiation’, to “achieve the progressive realisation of socio–economic rights” and 
protect “essential security interests”. Section 4(3) permits this may be via taxation, government 
subsidies, grants and government procurements”.295 
 
                                                          
291 Ibid 
292 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 
293 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 
294 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 
295 The Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, 2013 
56 
 
Essentially section 10’s role is to ensure that the Bill, in fostering investment maintains the 
standards and ambition of the Constitution. The Bill attempts to protect South Africa’s 
sovereign rights by ensuring all aspects of investment are consistent with the Constitution.296 
This ensures that the foreign investors will not dictate the terms of agreement in entirety as it 
may be to the detriment of the country and not in the public interest. 
 
It is clear the government is asserting its interests in social transformation, however many 
investors fear that these may be an imposition and limit them.297 The subjective nature of these 
sections creates a wait-and-see approach which discourages investors who wish to know that 
their investments will not suffer due to government intervention.298  
 
3.5.5 Screening of Investments 
 
The principle of sovereignty naturally extends to the regulation of foreign investment. Section 
5(2) codifies the principle of sovereignty by denying the right of establishment.299 Therefore, 
section 5(2) must be read in conjunction with section 6. Section 6(1) introduces the national 
treatment obligation for the South African government.300 However section 6(4) refers to the 
obligation as an examination, which appears to be more of a screening process than an 
examination.301 
 
In terms of the screening process, the procedural dimensions of the examination are unknown. 
It is unclear who would conduct the examination, particularly which state institution would 
take the lead on this issue.302 Furthermore, the question remains whether all investments will 
be screened, or whether only selective investments that are of certain potential will be subjected 
to the “screening” process. If it is the latter, the Bill needs to clarify the basis that such 
investments will be differentiated on, and whether the Bill would apply retrospectively.303 With 
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various areas requiring greater detail and substantial administrative regulation needed, a more 
elaborate provision would be useful as it will settle apprehensive investors. 
 
These subsections continue to state a very broad criteria against which the investment will be 
examined. Terms such as “the effect of the foreign investment on the Republic”; “the sector 
the investment is in”; “the aim of any measure relating to foreign investment”; and “other 
factors relating to the foreign investor or the foreign investment in relation to the measure 
concerned”, may afford the South African government greater discretion but are still extremely 
broad which instead of appeasing fears will encourage them.304  
 
3.5.6 National Treatment 
 
The principle of national treatment provides that foreign investments needs to be treated in a 
similar manner to local investments. This principle is also one of the cornerstone provisions in 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. In light of South Africa’s membership to 
the WTO, the country must comply with these principles. However, regarding the operation of 
national treatment as envisaged by the Bill, a question to consider is what will ensue where the 
host country subjects its investors to a lower standard relative to international standards.305  
 
The OECD defines the international minimum standard as a norm of customary international 
law which dictates the treatment of foreigners in a country.306 It provides a minimum set of 
principles which obligates governments, regardless of their domestic and legislative practices, 
to respect foreign nationals and their property. In comparing it with the principle of national 
treatment which foresees that foreign nationals can only expect equality of treatment with 
nationals, the international minimum standard sets a number of basic rights established by 
international law that governments must grant to foreign nationals, independent of the 
government’s treatment of their own citizens.307  
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Some argue that this a risk the investor takes, however in terms of customary international law 
there is no voluntary assumption of risk.308 However, in terms of international investment law 
there is the international minimum standard of treatment that is used to limit national treatment. 
The term “national treatment” in terms of international investment law has been riddled with 
nuances leading to its manipulation and violation. It is suggested due to this problem and the 
general lack of understanding section 6(4), it is advisable that the issue be dealt with on a case 
by case basis.309  
 
By dealing with the problem in this manner, the Bill is able to determine factors which will be 
used in determining national treatment. This does not mean that the Bill will not be able to 
apply these standards or apply a different standard. It means the converse applies, as the Bill 
has empowered itself to apply the principle of national treatment appropriately.  
 
3.5.7 Security of Investment 
 
Security in terms of investment is a method of protection and compensation for the investment. 
South Africa is required by international law to provide security to investors’ property. This is 
codified in section 7(1) of the Bill and states that the security will be dependent on “available 
resources and capacity”.310 Section 7(1) suggests that in the event there is a lack of resources 
the state will not be liable. In light of civil disobedience and South African citizen’s propensity 
to strike, the government would need to redraft clearer criteria that create a sense of confidence 
in investors that despite any civil disobedience, their investment will be secure and profitable.  
 
Moreover, Section 7(2) states that “appropriate” compensation will be paid to local and foreign 
investors for loss or damage due to requisitioning or destruction of property by government 
“forces or authorities” if such destruction was not caused “in combat action’.311 These 
qualifications are largely unclear and once again result in interpretational issues. This could 
result in them being circumvented and the protections neutralised. 
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Further, section 7(2) may be understood as a contradiction to the interpretation clause.312 
Section 7(2) states that compensation will be determined in accordance with domestic, 
international and international customary law.313 This differs from the interpretation clause 
which trumps customary international law with the Constitution. Moreover, international 
investment law does not provide much clarity regarding such compensation. Once again, 
according to the Bill, compensation is subjective and will be in line with what the state can 
afford. 
 
3.5.8 Expropriation Clause 
 
In terms of investment, expropriation314 is of great importance. Coupled with South Africa’s 
current political debacle over contested terrain; the expropriation clause is the most topical and 
important provision of the Bill. Section 8 provides that expropriation of an investment may 
only take place in accordance with the Constitution and in terms of the law of general 
application for “public purposes or in the public interests under due process of law” and against 
payment of “just and equitable” compensation.315 Further, the compensation must “reflect an 
equitable balance between the public’s interest and the interests of those affected’. This 
includes several factors that must be considered such as, the market value, the current use of 
investment, the history of the acquisition and the purpose of the expropriation.316 It is important 
to note the distinction between the Bill and the protection afforded to foreign investors under 
past BIT’s. 
 
It appears as though, Section 8(1) complies with customary international law as it provides that 
expropriation will be lawful so long as it is executed in the public’s interest.317  On the other 
hand, the Bill deviates from customary international law in terms of the level of 
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compensation318 stating that compensation must be just and equitable. This deviation is in line 
with the South Africa Constitution and is consistent with the interpretational clause of the 
Bill.319 Section 25 of the Constitution prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of property as well as 
the expropriation of property without payment of just and equitable compensation which has 
either been agreed upon or which has been decided by a court of law.320 It has been suggested 
that section 8(1) is simply compensation that the state can afford and is fairly subjective. It 
becomes apparent that the South African approach is indeed state centric unlike the customary 
international law’s approach which is investor or proprietary centric.321 Such a bias towards 
the host country will most likely discourage investors who are used to greater empowerment 
under the previous BITs. In light of this, a more balanced approach to compensation should be 
tabled for consideration. 
 
Even more, section 8(2) is a non–exhaustive list of conduct which would not be deemed to be 
considered expropriation. Firstly the subsection allows for concerted action, which has a 
negative effect on the value of an investment. This is of concern to foreign investors as under 
customary international law this is known as creeping or indirect expropriation.322 Secondly, 
in customary international law, the objective of pursuing public policy is to distinguish between 
lawful and unlawful expropriation. It is argued that the Bill has made an error, stating that a 
measure aimed at pursuing public policy is not expropriation.323 Thirdly, the issue of 
intellectual property is hindered in a similar manner. Under the Bill, there is a deprivation of 
intellectual property rights resulting in a decrease in value of these rights, which ultimately 
results in expropriation.324 Lastly, the provision makes state ownership an essential 
requirement for expropriation.325 
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In analysing this provision, it currently gives the government excess arbitrary power which 
could discourage foreign investors. The simple solution would be to realign the provision with 
customary international law and prevailing international investment standards. This would 
make the Bill far more investor friendly.  
 
3.5.9 Regulatory Space 
 
The South African government’s main reason for the drafting of the Bill was to afford the 
country more power in terms of regulating FDI. Section 10 forms an integral part of the Bill as 
it attends to the government’s agenda of affording themselves greater regulatory space. It 
addresses crucial aspects of the government’s economic and industrial policy and sheds light 
on the integral involvement of FDI in achieving sustainable development.326 The linking and 
implementation of these policies in conjunction with foreign investment will be extremely 
tedious and challenging. Furthermore, to create performance requirements for foreign investors 
seems too ambitious as it will most likely deter investors, instead of promoting their investment 
activity.  
 
3.5.10 Dispute Resolution  
 
Section 11 deals with the highly contentious dispute resolution provision of the Bill. Unlike 
BITs which generally permit a foreign investor to refer investment disputes with a government 
to international arbitration, the current Bill refers investment disputes to local courts.327 This 
would raise concerns where local courts are found to be easily influenced. This is fortunately 
not the case in South Africa as the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of the 
Constitutional democracy. 
  
The court system is a competent and impartial system that has very rarely acted in an untoward 
manner. Furthermore, it is not in the best interests of South Africa and FDI for the courts to be 
bias in favour of the government as it will only discourage foreign investment. For the host 
country, international arbitration is expensive and subjects government policies to a decision 
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made by a neutral third party. Moreover, international arbitrations work on a case by case basis 
with no judicial precedence.328 This may lead to inconsistent decisions being made and 
awarded.329  
 
Contrary to the international position, under the Bill, section 11330 the fact that the Arbitration 
Act is mentioned despite its archaic nature has left many critics of the Bill confused.331 Its 
inclusion leaves the door open for government to enter into contracts with individual investors 
instead of BITs.332 This would benefit the government as the contracts would be regulated by 
commercial contract law despite them having an arbitration clause.  
 
The Bill could have provided, that in the event an investor has failed to find redress in local 
courts, they may approach international tribunals.333 As it stands, the investor would require 
the governments consent for international arbitration to be enables investors to approach a 
competent court, tribunal or statutory body or refer a dispute to arbitration under the 1965 South 
Africa Arbitration Act enacted. The chances of a government consenting to this is unlikely and 
becomes a deterring factor for investors. With that said, South African courts and legal system 
have in the past upheld the rule of law reasonably well and our legal system is largely 




It appears that the balancing act of the Bill leans more towards protecting the sovereign rights 
of the government. This should not come as a surprise in the context of the decision to cancel 
existing BITs and do away with issues, such as international arbitration, that became extremely 
cumbersome for the South African government. Unfortunately many key areas dealing with 
investor’s rights and obligations are rather ambiguous, resulting in interpretational issues. 
Despite the uncertainty, no new obligations are imposed on foreign investors. 
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For investors who previously shared BITs with South Africa, the new government policy is a 
significant change. Under BITs, the relationship was far more limited and qualified. Under the 
Bill there is no right to fair and equitable treatment, as noted above no right to refer disputes to 
international arbitration and compensation in terms of expropriation is not guaranteed to equal 
the market value of the investment. Furthermore, the Bill can be solely amended by the 
government, unlike BITs which required both governments to agree. 
 
The effect of terminating BITs are not fully known but have clearly created a tense relationship 
between South Africa and the European Union. Whether this hinders future FDI flow or not, 
only time will tell. It is important to note that foreign investments are not entirely dependent 
on BITs, there are several other key factors such as level of return, taxes and business 
opportunities. However, BITs do provide preferential rights to foreign investors in comparison 
to local investors and to those foreign investors who do not share BITs with the host country.  
 
South Africa is in need of greater foreign investment and this can only be achieved with a clear 
and certain framework. Overall the Bill attempts to provide a good opportunity for South Africa 
to balance its domestic and international obligations. Unfortunately the current draft has not 
achieved this and amendments are needed in several areas. The government will need to now 
weigh the utility of an inherently biased Bill against the harm to foreign investors. Having 
analysed the Bill, the next chapter will look at the Bill in context of South Africa’s obligations 





















The previous chapter identified the manner by which South Africa has dealt with investment 
considering the political and economic framework. South Africa’s concerns as a developing 
country in terms of investment are novel as opposed to states such as Germany, the United 
States (US) and Japan. The US is a prime case as they emerged from World War Two as the 
most powerful nation in history with unrivalled shares of global Gross Domestic Profit (GDP), 
manufacturing and production rate, and military might. This allowed them to have an 
extraordinary influence on the way the world, specifically the multilateral trading system was 
shaped.334 The form that the multilateral system took may not have always been the preferred 
approach but it served the US interests and those who accepted the multilateral system over the 
imperial system.  
 
The post-World War Two architects’, the Allies, vision was hidden behind the curtain of 
ideologies that was the Cold War.335 The intentional ‘decline’ of the US and the rise of its allies 
were part of a greater plan to assert a new world order that supported and created global 
economic growth.336 Today this order is being challenged by the rise of the “rest” or the 
“different” as Ian Bremmer refers to the new geopolitical landscape that is currently taking 
shape.337 Bremmer goes on to explain that the new rising powers are fundamentally different, 
and it is their differences that creates a real challenge for the US.338 
 
Bremmer defines the rise of the “different”; firstly these countries are poor and they all have 
that in common.339 These countries are categorised as such by taking into consideration their 
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total economic size. Of interest is that, todays rising powers, such as Brazil, India, China, 
Russia and South Africa (hereafter referred to as BRICS), are more similar in respect of their 
emerging markets than the developed countries that built their wealth post- World War Two.340 
For example, China’s GDP is one-ninth of the US and India’s GDP is a mere one-thirty-fifth.341 
It is of interest to note that these countries form part of the BRICS nations; a fairly new unit of 
emerging developing states in respect of global trade. Timothy Shaw et al have expressed that 
the level of poverty and disparity in such countries haven driven them to seek development on 
a fundamental level.342 Thus, this group of countries’ objectives is to remain focussed on 
economic growth rather than becoming international stakeholders, much like the West did at 
their relevant point of development. This is encapsulated by Shaw et al who affirms that the 
‘global dynamic is undergoing a cumulative reordering process, where countries such as China, 
Brazil, India and Russia are occupying increasingly prominent roles in the international 
system.’343  
 
Furthermore, todays emerging markets are far more politically different than those of the Cold 
War. Of interest is that, Germany and Japan both took on the concept of representative 
governance and capitalism which has evidently worked out well for them.344 In contrast to this, 
by comparison the BRICS nations such as China is far more authoritarian, Russia is a petro-
state, and India is an amalgamation of carefully coordinated market capitalism and democratic 
liberalism, while Brazil is mirroring the Western model adopted by Germany and Japan.345 
Despite their varied differences, these emerging markets support the development of a new 
world order that dislocates power from the West.  
 
This discontentment has taken the form of the BRICS grouping. BRICS countries have been 
pushing for amongst others, greater representation in a global scale and have continued to 
challenge the practices of organisations like the United Nations (UN), the World Trade 
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Organisation (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).346 Having realised their 
disadvantages in respect of FDI (compared to some of the developed countries referred to 
above) these countries are amalgamating their resources to enhance especially their foreign 
direct investment (FDI) objectives.347  
 
In terms of this paper, the former context will be now be used to discuss South Africa’s 
involvement in BRICS. In particular, the chapter will provide a brief history of BRICS and 
South Africa’s admission into the new grouping and will include the build up to South Africa’s 
acceptance and reasons behind their membership. This background is needed for the discussion 
of FDI within BRICS nations. Therefore, the chapter will hone in on foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in BRICS, specifically looking at how South Africa stands to benefit in terms of FDI 
from their membership. Subsequently, the nature of the FDI relationship between each member 
of BRICS and South Africa will be highlighted to hypothesis the likely pattern of future FDI 
in South Africa. Lastly, China and India’s investment policy will be analysed in light of their 
commonalities, or lack thereof, with the South African FDI policy. 
 
4.2 South Africa’s entry into BRICS  
 
South Africa was granted an invitation to join the Brazil, Russia, India and China grouping at 
the end of 2010 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.348 The 
invitation came after months of lobbying by the South African government, who marketed 
themselves as the gateway to Africa. South Africa recognised the importance of belonging to 
such a grouping as membership to the group could greatly assist emerging economies, such as 
South Africa, who wish to have be involved in achieving a more equitable and balanced 
political and economic global structure. This was supported by the South African government 
who stated that their involvement in this bloc will facilitate economic benefits in terms of 
investment and trade, as well as political benefits in the form of a greater, louder, voice in the 
international sphere.349 
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Prior to this, Brazil, Russia, India and China were originally grouped as BRICs in 2001, and 
for the last decade and a half have been recognised as the fastest growing economies with their 
growth expected to leapfrog many of the developed economies.350 In 2006, the group officially 
became a diplomatic entity called BRIC.351 In 2011 the acronym was adjusted to BRICS with 
the addition of South Africa as the newest member. With the BRICS grouping finalised, they 
could focus on their primary objectives which were; to achieve greater levels of trade; improve 
their respective infrastructural development and empower themselves as a grouping.352 
Interestingly, between 2001 and 2011, the BRICS group of countries collective contribution to 
the world’s GDP ranged between South Africa which recorded the lowest average with 3.5 
percent, whiles China was at the other end of the scale boasting the highest GDP at 102 
percent.353   
 
Clearly, South Africa has a significantly smaller economy than the other BRICS countries, with 
a GDP around one quarter to one third of the Indian and Russian economies.354 Furthermore, 
the country also has the smallest population, the highest unemployment rate and the lowest 
savings.355 It does however sit in the upper-middle of the GDP per head statistics by both 
convention and purchasing power parity measures.356 These former points are part of the reason 
why the inclusion of South Africa has been met with mixed reactions.357 Despite the doubt 
surrounding South Africa’s involvement in the BRICS bloc, the country stands to benefit 
through the flow of increased trade and FDI.  
 
In light of these opportunities, it is essential to understand the nature of South Africa’s 
economy. At one level, South Africa is a continental powerhouse with a GDP averaging 25 per 
cent of the entire continent.358 The formal sector has been founded on services, mining and 
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manufacturing. South Africa has had a robust economy that has enjoyed a surplus of mineral 
resources and a well-developed legal, energy, financial and communications sectors. This is 
further supported by an efficient distribution of goods and services to urban centres and a stock 
exchange that ranks amongst the top 20 in the world.359 Unfortunately, these positives are 
juxtaposed by a dwindling infrastructure, a government riddled with corruption and citizens 
who are frustrated by the severe inequalities and suffer from growing poverty and high 
unemployment rates.360 
 
As has been alluded to, South Africa’s economic presence is far below its fellow BRICS 
members, however the country entered the group as the most powerful and stable economy on 
a fast growing continent.361 Moreover, South Africa’s involvement in the past few years has 
expanded to merely representing the entire continent and acting as a gateway to Africa but the 
country has played a pivotal role in talks involving the establishment of a new development 
Bank.362  
 
4.3 A South African perspective on BRICS and foreign direct investment 
 
Membership in the group is expected to result in; firstly, the country being allowed to promote 
economic development through improved trade and investment, secondly as the expansion of 
sectors in which South Africa has a comparative advantage, and lastly to provide foreign 
investment opportunities for South African industries.363 For other BRIC members, their focus 
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lies in achieving greater representation among developing nations and making inroads into 
Africa as it would create new opportunities and development among members.364 It is within 
this objective that South Africa’s role becomes pivotal and the country should utilise the 
position to strengthen its position within BRICS.  
 
South Africa’s membership will most likely provide new opportunities in terms of trade and 
investment opportunities for themselves, as well as the rest of the continent. The other four 
members of BRICS have increased capacity to bring expertise and technology to South Africa 
which can aid infrastructural development.365 Brazil, Russia, India and China account for 50 
percent of overall emerging market spending which suggests that there are many opportunities 
for the transfer of skills, knowledge and technology.366 Thus, placing South Africa in a prime 
position to enjoy higher levels of technological innovation, joint manufacturing, marketing and 
research projects and exchange programmes for skills and training.367 
 
In light of this, it is important that South Africa ensures that they can generate large portions 
of investment. According to the South African government, the country’s trade and investment 
will expand via its membership to BRICS.368 Despite these positives views, the country should 
be cautious of being too reliant on its BRICS membership and must maintain their existing 
relationships with its other trading partners outside of BRICS.369 The best way for South Africa 
to achieve this balance, will be by leveraging its membership to seek opportunities for joint 
ventures, mergers and cooperation with other BRIC countries currently investing in the 
continent and South Africa.370 
 
It is of interest that, in the build up to these relationships, several joint ventures have been 
established. Particularly between Chinese and South African firms. For example, the largest 
bank in South Africa, Standard Bank sold 20 per cent of the bank to the International 
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Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and in a joint statement the ICBC expressed its interest in 
South Africa as they regarded it a lucrative market for investment.371 From South Africa’s and 
Standard Bank’s perspective it appears to be extremely beneficial as it allows superior access 
to the world’s fastest growing economy, and facilitates trade and investment from Asia to 
Africa.372  
 
In light of these ventures, it suggests that these relationships are long term with the hope of 
tangible benefits for South Africa and the other BRICS members. There has also been 
considerable new interest in establishing innovative foreign investments as South Africa’s 
membership provides a strategic partnership for investors from other members. However there 
are fears that the influx of investors may allow BRIC investors to exploit the region.373  
 
In analysing the BRICS countries and their impact on South Africa, the numbers suggest that 
China has made the biggest impact on the country.374 The relationship between these two 
nations has followed a steady path of growth over the last decade and bilateral trade between 
the countries have been on the increase.375 There are many major Chinese companies investing 
in South Africa, establishing regional and local headquarters.376 Furthermore, in 2010 the two 
countries committed to a strategic partnership as a form of recognition of the current and future 
growth.377 The agreement focussed on issues of trade, mineral exploration, agriculture, 
investment as well as fostering national and political dialogues.378  
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Despite the positives of this relationship, there are fears that South Africa will lose out to 
increased market competition from countries like China. The concern stems from South Africa 
being the political nexus between its fellow BRIC members and the African continent. There 
are fears this may result in South Africa discouraging its own markets in Africa as the markets 
will become increasingly competitive.379 This is a legitimate concern as Africa is the only 
region where South Africa has a trade surplus in manufacturing.380  
 
The next member’s relationship to be discussed is India. South Africa is currently India’s 
second largest trading partner in Africa with trade between the two countries expected to 
increase to US$ 15 billion by the end of this year (2014).381 India’s relationship with South 
Africa is not as strong as the China – South Africa relationship as India has focussed on 
expanding its role on the continent, the effect of which was the creation of competition for 
South African companies.382 Despite their different approach, many Indian multinational 
corporations have made inroads into South Africa. The local market has seen the entry and 
investment by companies such as TATA, Reliance and Mahindra.383 The past few years has 
seen Indian investors show their willingness to invest in coal, iron ore and manganese mines 
in the country.384 An example of this being the JSW Energy acquisition of a majority stake in 
the South African Coal Mining Holdings in April 2010.385 Furthermore, on the nuclear front, 
India are keen on procuring uranium and nuclear technologies from South African 
companies.386 With inroads made by India, a free trade agreement (FTA) between the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and India is currently being negotiated.387  
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As for the other two BRICS members; Brazil’s and Russia’s FDI in South Africa is far less 
than that of China and India. Interestingly, South Africa is Brazil’s fourth largest trading 
partner, behind Nigeria, Angola and Algeria.388 This is largely due to the colonial and historical 
ties between these nations and Brazil, with Angola and Mozambique attracting the most interest 
from Brazilian multinationals.389 Much like Brazil, trade between the Russia and South Africa 
is limited as their focus lies in Africa with Russian investment into the continent expected to 
increase. Russia as a country is rich in resources but lacks the ability to invest in the same 
manner as a country like China.390 However Russia do share the same goals as China, India 
and Brazil in terms of economic expansion in South Africa. In 2009, the Russian President 
visited South Africa to assess and establish investment opportunities.391 These ventures were 
focussed around energy and nuclear power.392  
 
A point of interest is the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Cooperation entered into 
by credit insurance agencies of the BRICS countries.393 The goal of the MOU is to promote a 
non – exclusive framework that will encourage trade and investment via cooperative efforts 
between BRICS countries. Furthermore, to create joint projects envisaging the supply of goods 
and services from their respective countries to third countries therefore promoting BRICS 
products and services.394 Moreover, the MOU wishes to exchange experience in the form of 
guidelines and regulations on export credit and investment insurance.395 
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As noted above, South Africa yields power on a regional and continental level as it exports 
both mineral and agricultural products and provides services across the continent, as well as to 
BRICS nations.396 Despite this, South Africa still faces competition from China in terms of 
manufacturing and India in terms of services. Where South Africa does play a role is assisting 
BRICS maintain its diplomatic position as South Africa has maintained key relations with 
many developed countries.397 Furthermore, South Africa is regarded as a leader of the continent 
as it had lead the way on issues of the Millennium Development Goals and New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development.398 This form of global stature makes them an asset to the BRICS 
grouping. 
 
4.4 China and India’s position on foreign direct investment 
 
4.4.1 China  
 
According to the South African Reserve Bank, China has become South Africa’s biggest 
trading partner and is also the largest destination for South African exports.399 In terms of FDI, 
China is heavily involved in mining, manufacturing and construction within South Africa.400 It 
is reported that China’s FDI presence has grown from approximately R350 Million in 2005 to 
about R50 Billion in 2012.401 This is largely due to their involvement in the banking sector, as 
mentioned earlier with the acquisition of a portion of Standard Bank. In light of this, a 
comparison between South Africa and China’s FDI approaches will be discussed. It is 
important to note that this is not an analysis of China’s policy towards outward and inward FDI 
but a discussion on their approach in conjunction with South Africa’s approach. This is 
intended to shed some light on what future interactions between the two BRIC members may 
be like.  
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China’s success in attracting investment opportunities is largely attributed to its size and 
growing domestic market. The result of which is China having received approximately 20 
percent of all FDI to developing countries over the last decade.402 Their inward FDI has played 
an important role in their economic develop and export success with over half of all imports 
and exports stemming from foreign investment.403 This is a good example of the positive effect 
of high FDI rates resulting in higher productivity. Importantly, FDI has been the catalyst from 
China’s economic reform.404 
 
China’s FDI policies have evolved in conjunction with their economic development and 
strengthened institutional capacity. 405During the 1980s, China decided to open up foreign 
investment in selected coastal cities and particular economic zones.406 China also moved away 
from their fixation on GDP and embraced a more balanced developmental approach. Part of 
embracing this approach was their commitment to service liberalisation during its accession to 
the WTO.407 The effect of which was a shift to FDI in service industries. By the late 2000s, 
services had tripled while manufacturing FDI in China increased by 81 percent. This resulted 
in China becoming a hub for East Asia and thousands of multinationals have invested in 
China.408  
 
China has been open to FDI in manufacturing and service industries, however they have been 
cautious in their liberalisation to align with the development of institutional capacity. A 
decision which seems to have benefitted them in light of the most recent financial crisis.409 
Furthermore, China has a largely decentralised FDI approach which allows for competition for 
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FDI among local authorities.410 However this approach has the potential to produce excessive 
red tape and corruption, which are deterrents to investors.411 Such an approach requires 
transparency of regulations and communication between government and businesses alike. A 
possible solution to this is for local governments to seek administrative and operational 
efficiency of the approval process. 
 
Based on the above information, it appears as though China has done well to position itself, 
however its new challenge is to attract the appropriate form of FDI. In response to this, the 
Chinese government in an attempt to balance its economy, has been more selective in its 
approach to attract energy efficient and technologically advanced industries. 
 
Chinese and South African investors seem to both appreciate a long–term approach orientated 
around establishing good relationships with their relevant FDI host countries. South African 
firms are in favour of this approach as they deem it profitable and useful as they operate within 
their own region and can therefore capitalise on the markets closest to them.412 This is important 
to the South African government as they intend on growing in conjunction with the continent. 
This however is a utopian approach that is far easier in principle than in practice.413 Apart from 
this, South Africa needs to address the errors of the Promotion and Protection of Investment 
Bill to be more investor friendly.414  
 
Furthermore, South Africa needs to work on their own negative image that is a combination of 
the legacy of Apartheid and contemporary issues, such as those of striking and high 
unemployment rates. The Chinese approach towards long term business relations is largely 
founded on norms and values within Chinese business culture.415 A key difference is that South 
African investors seem to connect far more with the local community. Unlike Chinese investors 
who typically focus on their relations with the host government.416   
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4.4.2 India’s review of their FDI Policy 
 
It is of interest that India, South Africa’s fellow BRICS member, has also decided to review 
their FDI policy. In light of this paper, one may deem a brief discussion of India’s reasoning 
and its approach to be relevant as such a discussion can shed light on whether there is common 
ground between South Africa and India in reviewing their BITs. Moreover, this discussion will 
provide an examination into future interactions between these two BRICS members may be 
similar. 
 
The departing of Congress and the swearing of the new Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has 
brought about some immediate alterations with international ramifications.417 One such 
immediate alteration to the status quo was the Prime Minister’s announcement that India would 
be reviewing their FDI policy.418 BITs have been largely perceived by the Indian public to be 
protecting and promoting foreign investors.419 The main issue with BITs involving India as the 
host nation is the empowering of foreign investors to directly bring claims against the host 
country at an international arbitration forum.420 Since BITs control the exercise of public 
power, the BIT arbitrations have the ability to adjudicate on public functions like monetary 
policy and taxation measures.421 
 
India, since 1994, has 80 BITs with 72 still being enforced.422 Most of these BITs are foreigner 
investor friendly with legal interpretations favouring investment and investor protection of the 
regulatory powers by the Indian government.423 Interestingly the past three years has witnessed 
two key developments that urged India to embark on their revision of BITs.424 The first issue 
being the BIT tribunal in the case of White Industries V India425; where for the first time India 
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was found to violate its BIT obligations with Australia.426 The second involved India being 
taken to arbitration by large foreign investors, like Vodafone and Telenor, as they wished to 
challenge several regulatory measures, such as the imposition of retrospective taxation.427 
These are just the tip of the iceberg in terms of claims against India by foreign investors. The 
most recent issue was by a French shipping service and maritime company after they pulled 
out of an agreement between them and the Indian government two years ago.428 
 
These issues acted as a trigger for India to start the review process, however before the White 
Industries case, there had been lobbying for a review process in light of India’s vulnerability 
to such BITs claim.429 In light of this, it is presumed that the decision to review existing BITs 
has been largely welcomed. Despite this, information regarding the process and way forward 
is limited with only a few media articles and scholar’s interpretations of the way forward being 
available. Therefore the way forward remains somewhat unknown.  
 
This is in contrast to the South African approach who has reviewed their BITs and are in the 
process of adopting a new Investment Bill. The South African government, from the start of 
the review process, were open about why they chose to cancel their existing BITs and once the 
Bill was drafted, it was open to the public to comment and criticise. However, the reasons 
behind India and South Africa reviewing and cancelling their BITs were largely the same, as 
both governments felt the international arbitration aspect of the BITs agreements worked 
consistently in favour of the foreign investor. It is submitted that this common ground between 
the two nations will facilitate future FDI that protects both the investor and the government 
equally. Their close relationship may cogently act as a form of checks and balances in 
establishing successful FDI links. Furthermore, if one were to apply the possibility of the 
Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill’s clause on domestic arbitration, South African 
courts will ensure that Indian investors are not subjected to an unfair trial.    
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4.5    The next step: BRICS development bank 
 
BRICS have made clear inroads into Africa and have taken steps to decentralise the traditionally 
western nature of the multilateral trading system. Arguably the biggest step taken so far by the young 
grouping is their intention to establish a development bank and emergency reserved fund.430  
Furthermore, leaders of the five BRICS countries have signed a deal to create this new international 
financial institution. Which appears to be more than a political gesture but a state of intention and a 
bargaining tool.431  
 
A monetary institution of this nature should not be taken for granted as it is important to developing 
countries. The Bank itself will not rival the World Bank and IMF in size, however it does not need too 
as they do not intend to take on the multilateral trading system’s responsibilities.432 Despite the IMF 
promising reform433, developing countries are not convinced and believe the West will still possess 
considerable power in terms of the allocation of funds.434 
 
The Bank will start off with $50 Billion in initial capital.435 The emergency reserve fund will have a 
further $100 Billion and is intended to assist developing countries avoid “short – term liquidity 
pressures, promote further BRICS cooperation, strengthen the global financial safety net and 
complement existing  international arrangements”.436 The establishment of the BRICS bank is 
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anticipated to be in direct competition with the World Bank as well as other regional monetary funds. 
Even more, BRICS nations have criticised the World Bank and the IMF for failing to give developing 
countries substantial voting rights.437 Therefore one of the goals of the bank is to empower developing 
countries to have a greater voice in ascertaining loans for infrastructure projects.  
 
BRICS commitment to investing more resources and money into their new institution rather 
than the existing one suggests that they do wish to afford developing countries more power and 
alter the multilateral system.438 However, these steps taken are to lay a foundation for what 
may be a gradual departure from the IMF and World Bank. China, India and Brazil are all still 
heavily invested in the World Bank which will allow the US to breathe easy, however if greater 
reform is not introduced and developing countries continue to be marginalised it will be to the 




A theme of this chapter is the common ground that is shared between the discussed emerging 
economies. It is true these developing countries share the same interests and agenda on a global 
stage, however this is not to say that they are also not competing with each other. Developing 
countries all prioritise on their own developmental needs and securing greater concessions from 
developed countries in trade negotiations.440 BRICS member countries are no different as their 
ambition is not only shared but overlaps. Almost all five members of the BRICS members can 
be considered regional hubs that yield a strong influence over their neighbours.441 India and 
China find themselves in direct competition for the prime spot of East Asia, whilst South Africa 
is deemed the sole regional point of authority in Southern Africa.442 This is coupled with the 
competition for international status and recognition as developing nations call for greater 
reform of the UN Security Council, as well as other international institutions.443 The 
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competition between BRICS members further increases as the countries’ economies grow. 
China has in recent times controlled the market in terms of manufacturing and trade, 
furthermore they are the second biggest exporter to the USA after Canada.444 This has forced 
its fellow BRICS member, India, to focus on education and services445 as they cannot compete 
with the low wages assembly-lines of the Chinese manufacturing sector.446  
 
In light of the competition, a question worth asking is what exactly South Africa contributes to 
BRICS, apart from being a gateway to Africa. South Africa’s membership to the BRICS 
grouping was largely based on economic logic and not on its global profile.447 South Africa’s 
participation in BRICS is significant as it provides important opportunities to build their 
manufacturing sector, establish a consistent flow of technology and ideas, improve value-added 
exports and provide a platform for South Africa businesses to develop and expand. The 
country’s general stability has allowed it to become synonymous with Africa opportunities 
investment.  
 
In terms of the Protection and Promotion of Investment Bill, it should not impact BRICS as a 
grouping and South Africa’s interactions with its fellow BRICS members. If the ambiguities 
and points of revision of the Bill are comprehensively addressed, South Africa will find itself 
in a position of power when negotiating their foreign investment relationships with its fellow 
BRICS members. In turn the foreign investors from the BRICS nations should respect and work 
within the limits of the Bill. It is submitted that the Bill was drafted as part of South Africa’s 
geopolitical realignment and should work in favour of the BRICS investors. 
As for South Africa’s obligations under the WTO, the South African representatives will have 
greater negotiating power working in tandem with its fellow BRICS members. This is key, as 
BRICS offers its members a much welcomed “group effort” allowing these countries, such as 
South Africa, the ability to meet their WTO obligations while standing their ground and avoid 
being bullied by the more developed countries. It is a truly fascinating time as the five members 
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of BRICS have their differences. However, despite the differences between South Africa and 
its BRICS counterparts, there are opportunities for all members. Importantly, it is their 
differences that make them a strong grouping that has the potential to alter the global economic 























5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This paper was based on South Africa’s change in approach to foreign investment in context 
of its obligations as a developing nation and in light of these changes, how the country’s plans 
will affect its position in the Multilateral Trading system. It has been argued that due to the 
changing geopolitical structure and strengthening of emerging markets that there is a gradual 
decentralisation of the multilateral trading system. Therefore the manner in which foreign 
investment is conducted between the developed and developing nations has changed as 
developing countries, such as South Africa are embracing a new approach that empowers and 
protects them.  
 
At the outset, this paper aimed to critically analyse the country’s foreign investment policy and 
its effects on particular trade relationships. Specifically this paper has considered the historic 
foreign investment partners of South Africa, such as the European Union, as well as new 
partners, such as China and India. The paper analysed The Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill as it represents South Africa’s attempt to move away from the previous system 
of Bilateral Investment Treaties. Furthermore, this paper explored South Africa’s accession to 
the grouping of Brazil, China, Russia, India and South Africa (BRICS) and the relationship 
shared between South Africa and its fellow member countries. Special focus is paid to their 




Understanding the multilateral trading system, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs 
(GATT) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) provided the foundation of this paper. 
However, there are two important questions to be answered; the first being to what extent has 
international law evolved to accommodate developing countries in respect of international 
trade relations, and the second question being the extent to which the WTO has promoted 




In terms of the first question, it is clear that developing countries have found themselves in a 
constant uphill battle when dealing with the WTO. Despite the principles of the WTO, such as 
the Most Favoured Nation and Single Undertaking principles, reports suggest that the WTO 
has favoured developed countries.448 The progress made through the GATT years and the WTO 
largely stemmed from developing countries asserting themselves and working together to seek 
benefits. For many developing countries the GATT and the WTO in principle presented many 
opportunities but in practice it failed. This was largely due to the exclusivity exercised by 
developed countries who had larger markets and therefore could influence the smaller, more 
fragile and desperate, developing countries. As for developing countries, their lack of 
infrastructure restricted their ability to negotiate and grow under the WTO. This thesis has 
proffered the argument that the multilateral system was implemented and shaped by the 
developed countries, such as the United States, and has consistently worked in favour of 
them.449 Whether it be in terms of liberalising markets or restricting trade, more often than not, 
it has favoured the established economic powerhouses. This meant those who could work 
alongside them benefitted and those who couldn’t, battled to benefit. 
 
With the WTO failing to empower developing countries on a tangible or substantial level, the 
next point of discussion is the manner in which the WTO has promoted the aspect of 
investment. The GATT years did not prioritise much on investment and apart from the failure 
of Havana Charter; there had been minimal focus on investment. The birth of the WTO brought 
with it discussions and negotiations that tabled issues of investment and the establishment of 
two agreements that deal with investment on varying levels, the Agreement on Trade – Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMS) and the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
However a framework for investment is still non – existent despite the growing importance of 
foreign investment in building and sustaining economies.  
 
In light of no international framework for investment existing, countries over the last 20 years 
have relied bilateral investment treaties (BITs). BITs encourage and strengthens the rule of law 
where court systems are weak or impartial against foreign investors. However, it appears as 
though the relationship between BITs and FDI suggest that BITs are not necessary or sufficient 
to attract FDI. This is supported by the fact that South Africa receives FDI from investors in 
                                                          
448 Hoekman, Bernard M. and Kostecki, Michel, (1995), The Political Economy of the World Trading System: 
from GATT to WTO. Oxford: Oxford University Press, (page 195) 
449 As discussed in Chapter 2, page 17 
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countries with whom it has no BITs with. One of the biggest issues with BITs is whether the 
rule of law is adequately upheld in investor – state dispute settlement (ISDS) systems or in the 
BITs that underpin it.  
 
As noted in this paper, these frustrations with BITs resulted in the South African government 
reviewing its BITs, as well as the role of foreign investment in South Africa and the levels of 
protection afforded to investment, and the risks and benefits of BITs. The review of South 
Africa’s BITs confirmed the frustration experienced by the South African government in terms 
of international arbitration. The review further confirmed the importance of FDI to the South 
African economy as foreign investors are present in all sectors of the economy. Furthermore, 
FDI has grown steadily and has the potential to grow further.450 
 
This is largely attributed to South Africa being regarded as one of the more open jurisdictions 
in international trade and offers investment protection and stability that is of the highest 
standard. Protection is provided by the Constitution451 and complementary legislation, among 
other forms of business securities. Importantly, foreign investors enjoy the same protection as 
domestic investors and have equal access to administrative justice.452 In terms of foreign 
investor protection, a significant point for is the manner in which the issue of expropriation is 
viewed by the host nation. In terms of South Africa, expropriation may only occur within the 
law of general application and for public purposes.453 Expropriation is subject to compensation, 
which is expected to be justifiable and must reflect a fair balance between the public interest 
and that of foreign investors.454 
 
In light of this, and the frustrations of BITs, the decision was made by the South African 
government to terminate the majority of their existing BITs and refrain from engaging in new 
BITs. The government aimed to re - negotiate BITs on the basis of a new model. This new 
model took the shape of the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill455 and is aligned with 
the Constitution. Importantly, it maintains that South Africa is open to FDI whiles maintaining 
                                                          
450 Xanthi Payi, ‘Attracting FDI key to South Africa and Africa’s growth and development agenda’ available at 
www.stanlib.com, accessed on 14 July 2014 
451 Refer to Chapter 3, specifically 3.11 
452 The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 
453 Expropriation Act 63 of 1975 
454 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill Submission to the Department of Trade and Industry’, available 
at www.saiia.org.za, accessed on 25 April 2014 
455 The Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 
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the country’s sovereign right456 of the government to follow and work towards the necessities 
of public policy and act in constitutionally consistent manner.  
 
The Bill is the culmination of lessons of the past, with the new legal framework for investment 
being better equipped to meet the challenges of sustainable development and growth. The 
constitutional values have been maintained with the Bill encompassing equitable relationships 
between the government and the foreign investor based on due process, the rule of law, and 
security of property rights.  
 
Despite the Bill attempting to balance the interests of the host nation and the foreign investor, 
the Bill leans more towards protecting the sovereign rights of the government.457 This should 
not come as a surprise in context of the decision to cancel existing BITs and do away with 
issues, such as international arbitration, that became extremely cumbersome for the South 
African government. Unfortunately many key areas dealing with investor’s rights and 
obligations are rather ambiguous, resulting in interpretational issues. Despite the uncertainty, 
no new obligations are imposed on foreign investors. 
 
South Africa’s alteration of foreign investment policy is evident of the country wishing to assert 
itself as an emerging market who deserves recognition as a regional, continental and global 
leader. The opportunity for South Africa to assert itself has become a tangible prospect with 
the country’s recent membership to the BRICS grouping. It has been highlighted that South 
Africa has faced much criticism and negative press regarding their involvement in the BRICS 
bloc as many believe they lack the influence and power of China, Brazil, India and Russia458. 
Thus based on the arguments proffered, it appears as though South Africa’s seat at BRICS 
comes down to strategy in terms of trade, location and political relations. There are a new set 
of super power countries on their way and they are doing things in a slightly unorthodox way 
when compared to past standards. This is not a surprise, as BRICS, encompassing some of the 
fastest growing developing countries, has made their objective known: to displace the 
economic (and possibly political) power that has been traditionally held by the West. In 
asserting this new world order, South Africa’s involvement is good business as it provides a 
                                                          
456 Section 5(2) of the Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill, 2013 
457 Promotion and Protection of Investment Bill Submission to the Department of Trade and Industry’, available 
at www.saiia.org.za, accessed on 25 April 2014 
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stable financial gateway to the rest of Africa for its fellow members. Furthermore, in light of 
the new BRICS bank being established, it is vital that there is an African presence for 
infrastructural development. 
 
South Africa’s participation in BRICS is significant as it provides important opportunities to 
build their manufacturing sector, establish a consistent flow of technology and ideas, improve 
value-added exports and provide a platform for South Africa businesses to develop and expand. 
The country’s general stability has allowed it to become synonymous with African 
opportunities for investment. Despite the differences between South Africa and its BRICS 
counterparts, there are opportunities for all members. Importantly, it is their differences that 
make them a strong grouping that has the potential to alter the global economic status of 
emerging markets. Thus, they find common ground in their hunger to develop and empower 
themselves.  
 
It is still early days for the BRICS grouping, however the initial moves and mergers that have 
taken place show that BRICS mean business and cannot be taken lightly. South Africa is in a 
prime position to be involved in these changes to the geopolitical structure of the world. At the 
very least, the grouping is a threat to organisations like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and the WTO who risk irrelevance if BRICS is able to loosen the dependency these 
organisations have on many developing countries and least developed countries. The trajectory 
of BRICS goes well beyond this paper, however it submitted that their progress will be slow, 
steady and calculated as they manoeuvre themselves through the political and economic 
sensitivity that is international trade. However, this does not mean that current powerhouses 
that have the largest influence on financial trends will be impotent or lack influence. This is 
evident with the demonination for the BRICS bank being the US Dollar.  
 
5.3 Recommendations 
5.3.1 Chapter Two 
 
In light of the gradual growth investment has undergone under the multilateral system, it 
appears that it is an appropriate time for the WTO to establish an international framework for 
investment. Their inability to have previously done so must be considered in context of the 
1990s, when the WTO established itself and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) 
87 
 
failed. 20 years later, the world is characterised not by the developed countries who founded 
the WTO, but by the developing countries. Emerging economies, led by China, India and Brazil 
are now major investors across the globe which suggests WTO may be the appropriate platform 
for a single investment regime.459  
 
For international trade to keep moving forward, it requires a stable and certain environment 
that allows for investments to prosper, therefore creating greater wealth and development. This 
has been shown by the steady increase of FDI since the global financial crisis that caused the 
decline due to economic fragility and policy uncertainty across many developed and 
developing economies.460 The investment environment is not assisted by the varying 
international investment coverage afforded by certain agreements, primarily TRIMS and 
GATS461 thus the lack of a central authority on investment needs to be addressed as the future 
of investment cannot be ignored. Expansive discussions, concerning investment, need to be 
initiated and welcomed. Issues such as dispute settlement, international investment by state – 
owned enterprises and the public – private partnership can assist greater international 
investment.462  
 
There are several regional negotiations regarding FDI and a single international investment 
agreement can be the platform for which to consolidate these agreements and create a stable, 
predictable environment for international trade.463 However, the creation of such a regime will 
not be easy and is expected to be a long and tedious process as there will have to be balancing 
of political and economic situations to create a new global standard. It is suggested that these 
negotiations are made in conjunction with other long-term discussions on international trade. 
The joint platforms are opportunities to promote mutual understanding among governments, as 
well as between governments and its citizens, in the effort to create a single regime for 
international investment that protects the interests of all parties.464 
 
                                                          
459 Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stepherson, ‘The Case for Framework Agreement on Investment’ available at 
www.vcc.clumbia.edu accessed on 10 October 
460 Ibid 
461 Refer to Chapter 2, 2.4 
462 Gary Hufbauer & Sherry Stepherson, ‘The Case for Framework Agreement on Investment’ available at 





It is suggested that such a framework is created as a plurilateral agreement. The WTO has 159 
members and custom territories, therefore only willing nations should be signatories to the 
agreement.465 The initial benefits of being a member to such an agreement would be the benefit 
of certain rights, such as the most-favoured-nation (MFN) principle.466 This will hopefully 
attract greater numbers to join the new regime. Currently, all rights that were once exclusive to 
signatories may be extended to all WTO members. 
 
However, it should be noted that the recommended regime would not supersede BITs or free 
trade agreements (FTAs), instead the goal should be for them to coexist. Therefore in disputes, 
complainants could choose recourse under the proffered agreement depending on which is 
deemed most favourable.467 Furthermore, a comprehensive regime would be far more 
advantageous for smaller states to rely on as they would not need to negotiate new BITs with 
other states. Smaller states are now placed on platform where they are accessible and have 
access to other economies.  
 
The failure of the MAI discussions in the 1990s has taught us the importance of laying a solid 
foundation before engaging in negotiations on international investment in a multilateral trading 
system.468 The on-going bilateral and regional negotiations can be used as the first – step 
towards unscrambling the multitude of agreements and setting long-term investment strategies. 
A single international investment landscape has the potential to reflect a comprehensive regime 
that international trade can rely on to generate sustainable growth. Which in turn will assist the 
WTO maintain relevance within the multilateral trading system. 
 
5.3.2 Chapter Three 
 
In attracting greater FDI, South Africa needs to establish a clear and certain framework that 
ensures foreign investors feel secure and confident in investing in the country. The Promotion 
and Protection of Investment Bill provides a great opportunity for South Africa to balance its 
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domestic and international obligations, whiles simultaneously prioritising on which countries 
and regions it wishes to build investment relations with.  
Unfortunately, the current draft of the Bill fails to achieve there are several aspects that require 
refining. It should be noted that since the amendments have been highlighted and discussed in 
Chapter three of this paper, the current chapter will therefore focus on the balancing of rights 
of the South African government and foreign investors.  
 
In light of this, a relevant question that must be put before the South African government which 
is whether the utility of an inherently biased bill outweighs the harm to foreign investors, and 
foreign investment in general. It is submitted that the requisite amendments will not devalue 
the Bill, moreover, instead it has the prospect to allow for a more a balanced approach that 
empowers South Africa and encourages future foreign investment. However, the government 
should not allow the legislation to remain bias as it will detract from the original intention of 
reviewing their BITs and overall approach to FDI. Ultimately it is important that the Bill 
represents an equitable relationship between all parties, based on the respect of human rights, 
rule of law and due process.  
 
5.3.3 Chapter Four 
 
Realistically, South Africa’s dependency on traditional sources of FDI will remain intact for 
years to come as BRICS is still in its teething stages. In the promise of future FDI inflows from 
BRICS increasing, South Africa needs to equip itself immediately and this paper will attempt 
to proffer some suggestion in this regard. 
 
Firstly, the government needs to finalise their FDI policy approach in terms of inward and 
outward FDI. As they focus on finalising their FDI policy (the Promotion and Protection of 
Investment Bill) the government needs to work on reducing deterrents of FDI such as 
corruption and high unemployment rates, in order to bolster the development of the country.   
Secondly, South Africa needs to invest in its primary sectors for investment which are namely 
metals and resources. Most of the BRICS members are in need of such resources and South 
Africa should capitalise on this by ensuring these materials are off the highest quality and best 
value. Also, South Africa needs to meet the needs of its fellow BRICS members by creating a 
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stable economic environment that allows for the members to invest in South Africa. By doing 
so, the country will maintain a competitive edge over the rest of the African continent. 
 
Thirdly, to translate this potential into material investments for South Africa and its fellow 
BRICS members, there are a few points worth raising; the first being the need for greater 
collaboration across research institutions in the BRICS to support the transfer of knowledge. 
The BRICS members need to engage in a comparative study of each other’s investment 
framework and regulations. This is important, in light of policy alterations and economic 
advancements that should encourage investment and not hinder the process. This will allow for 
linkages to be established between investment, trade and industry.  
 
Furthermore, to assist the relationship between South Africa and its fellow BRICS members, 
there needs to be a deeper understanding of the various factors influencing decisions of BRICS 
investors. This support can take the form of joint approaches to investment and cooperation 
based on principles of sustainable FDI. BRICS Members will need to also focus on the value 
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